A cohesive civil society, improvements in education, and increased international support for media outlets would open more space for freedom of expression and help further Iraq’s democratic transition.
During the celebration of the 155th Iraqi Press Day, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al-Sudani proudly declared that ‘there are no detainees or prisoners because of journalistic opinion in Iraq [no one is imprisoned because of their thoughts].’ However, this sentiment, likely echoed by his predecessors, overlooks the victims of persecution – those who were killed, disappeared, fled the country, or were forced into bitter silence. Today, over two decades since the political shift and transition towards democracy, Iraq remains ranked 169th in the Press Freedom Index. Notably, this low ranking was omitted from the Prime Minister’s speech at the ceremony.
Decline of freedoms
In recent years, there has been little progress in press freedom and general liberties in Iraq. In fact, there has been a noticeable decline, as evidenced by the continued enforcement of old laws that condemn critics and opponents, impose strict censorship on opinion makers and journalists, and disregard international standards of human rights and freedom of expression.
The concerned authorities have rejected repeated demands to amend or suspend certain articles, particularly Article 226 of the amended Iraqi Penal Code of 1969, pertaining to insulting the authorities. The same applies to Articles 433 and 434, which pertain to insult, slander, and defamation. At the same time, laws supporting freedoms, such as the Right to Access Information Law, remained under review and postponement. Meanwhile, efforts continued to enact laws that restrict those freedoms, such as the Cybercrime Law and the Peaceful Demonstration Law.
On the other hand, the growth of armed groups has led to further restrictions on press freedom. These groups have been involved in arrests outside the state’s framework, as well as assassinations, kidnappings, and forced disappearances, which are widely believed to be linked to the military wings of political movements and parties participating in power.
The same can be said for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where the ruling parties’ failure to entrench the concepts of freedom, democracy, and the peaceful transfer of power has led to further restrictions on press freedom in the region.
Causes and accumulations
This decline did not happen in a vacuum, as this ‘democratic backsliding’ is a result of many overlapping factors and their accumulations since the regime change in 2003. The political class that assumed power at that time initially adopted a discourse promoting the concepts of freedom and democracy. However, this did not last, and those concepts either receded or, worse, were mere lip service. The negative role played by religious and sectarian polarisation in weakening the concepts of democracy in the new regime cannot be ignored. This polarisation was accompanied by a lack of democratic awareness among the public, who lived for a long time under a totalitarian regime that placed harsh barriers on the press and freedom of expression.
The situation might have been more favorable had the emerging democracy in Iraq received better international support. However, international parties approached the situation in Iraq purely pragmatically, failing to consider its unique nature and the potential influence of neighboring regimes, often described as ‘dictatorial’. The impact of surrounding countries on Iraq has exacerbated the targeting of opinion makers and journalists, leading to further restrictions on their freedom, mirroring the situations in those neighboring countries.
On the domestic front, the decline in the level of education and the poor output of humanities faculties have worsened the situation of freedoms in Iraq. These faculties have long been considered the primary source of the intellectual class. It can be argued today that the decline of that class and the isolation of what remains of it, have led to a distorted relationship between the political class and the academic and research communities. This relationship is characterized by exchanging reciprocal favors based on loyalty and benefits rather than advice and critique.
Preserving what is left
The lust of the ruling parties to consolidate more power may undermine what has previously been described as ‘democratic gains’. This description, if true, refers only to limited gains that are gradually being eroded by the intensification of internal conflicts between political forces and their associated armed factions.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Iraqi journalists work in a risky environment. Under the inherited laws, any article, blog post, or news item can easily be classified as a direct charge that subjects its author to legal action. The authorities tend to use these laws whenever they need to silence dissent, especially given the absence of laws that require official institutions to provide data and information to journalists. This forces journalists to obtain information from sources that may be described as ‘unreliable’.
A cohesive civil society would strengthen public freedoms and provide more space for freedom of expression, ensuring an independent press capable of assuming its role as the ‘fourth estate’. It would also help opinion makers overcome existing challenges such as security targeting and legislative shortcomings, and counter the efforts of powerful parties to buy off individuals affiliated with civil society and journalism. To achieve these goals, civil society in Iraq today relies on the spirit of protest, despite the novelty of the experience, lack of leadership expertise, insufficient tools, and inadequate international support.
In contrast to the novelty of civil society, independent journalists in Iraq have become adept at escaping prosecution by avoiding naming parties, militias, and personalities in their journalistic outputs, instead only alluding to them by mentioning the characteristics and features of such individuals and entities. Some of them may sometimes venture to publish in media outlets operating from outside Iraq, approaching some of the red lines imposed on them by press restrictions in Iraq, in the hope that this will help keep them out of danger.
The pivotal role played by international organisations in funding and sustaining some independent media outlets is worth mentioning, albeit they are too few in number. These and other outlets that still lack funding are struggling to maintain a minimum level of free press vis a vis the invasion of media supported by influential parties. It is this struggle that will ensure the continuation of a free press in Iraq, the cornerstone of any democratic system.
In conclusion, the international community must be reminded of its responsibility to nurture the emerging freedoms within the new experiment that it has helped to build. All of the above, combined with the heavy legacy of dictatorship and the nature of the rentier economy, work together to stifle the Iraqi democratic experiment and the freedom of expression it entails.
Countries that support democracy should reassume their responsibility for the alarming decline of freedoms in Iraq by urging all Iraqi authorities to improve the legal and legislative environment. Making freedom of expression a prerequisite for developing relations, concluding contracts, and providing loans and other facilities could help address this issue.
International actors may also be expected to organise joint forums attended by journalists, policymakers, and representatives from various authorities and agencies to learn about successful experiences and discuss opportunities to expand and sustain them.
This article is part of a series from Chatham House that provides in-depth insights into the inner-workings of Iraq’s government and evaluate what recent developments – both public and behind the scenes – reveal about prospects for a more a stable, accountable and prosperous Iraqi state.
This series is part of the workstream on the political economy of reform, under the Middle East and North Africa Programme’s Iraq Initiative, led by project director Dr Renad Mansour.
