Syria’s post-Assad transition marks a defining moment – one that presents both immense opportunities and complex challenges. Among the most critical and contentious debates is the model of governance that will shape Syria’s future. This issue is pivotal not only because of its far-reaching impact on daily life, and public services and institutions, but because it is a fundamental point of division among key stakeholders – both internal and external.
Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa has made his preference for a highly centralized system clear. For al-Sharaa, centralization is not just a matter of administrative control, but a strategic necessity shaped by internal divisions and regional geopolitical interests, particularly those of Turkey and Iran. However, major Syrian actors – particularly the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration and the Druze community – argue that decentralization is essential for their cooperation with the new government. Ankara, al-Sharaa’s key ally, supports centralization to curtail Kurdish autonomy; Tehran, by contrast, may seek to exploit local fragmentation to maintain its influence.
While centralization offers the promise of efficient governance and national unity, it risks deepening long-standing grievances and marginalizing Syria’s diverse communities – challenges that could threaten long-term stability. A more balanced approach, combining strong national institutions with regional autonomy, may offer the best path forward. This model would preserve national cohesion while empowering local authorities to address regional needs, fostering a more inclusive and sustainable political system.
A fragmented governance landscape
Since 2011, Syria has experienced fragmented governance. The Assad regime retained authority over significant areas, including Damascus, enforcing a centralized, authoritarian system that tightly controlled political life and public policy. In contrast, non-regime-held territories developed their own governance models, repurposing state institutions under competing political and ideological structures.
In the northwest, Turkish-backed factions established semi-independent local administrations under Ankara’s supervision that became increasingly integrated into Turkey’s economic and bureaucratic systems. In Idlib, the HTS-backed Salvation Government consolidated control over governance, judicial processes and economic affairs, adopting centralized state structures. In the northeast, the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) implemented a decentralized governance model that, theoretically, emphasizes bottom-up decision-making – though formal participatory mechanisms remain weak and many citizens remain uninformed about policy decisions until after they are enacted.
Following Assad’s fall on 8 December 2024, HTS swiftly asserted control over regime-held areas, positioning its Salvation Government as the transitional authority. Yet, Syria’s governance remains fractured, with the various administrative systems competing for legitimacy. Al-Sharaa has signed agreements with both the AANES and the Druze leadership in Sweida to bring them under the administration of the Syrian state. However, both parties view decentralization as central to their respective visions for the country – directly clashing with HTS’s and al-Sharaa’s centralizing agenda. As al-Sharaa has stated, “There will be no division of Syria and no federalism in any form.”
Geopolitical calculations
Turkey, a key ally of al-Sharaa, has long viewed Syrian Kurdish autonomy as a national security threat, fearing that any form of decentralized governance – especially one that grants Kurdish regions a degree of self-rule – could embolden Kurdish movements within its own borders. As a result, Turkey seeks to dismantle Kurdish self-governance structures and ensure that local authorities in northern Syria remain under firm central control. Ankara’s military presence in northern Syria and influence over armed opposition groups further strengthen its ability to shape post-conflict governance. Al-Sharaa reportedly sees Turkish support as essential for consolidating his leadership.[1] This makes it more probable that he will continue pushing for centralization, even at the risk of alienating key Syrian constituencies.
Beyond Turkey’s influence, al-Sharaa’s centralization drive can also be seen as a strategy to counterbalance Iran’s regional ambitions. For years, Iran has sought to expand its influence in Syria, viewing the country as a vital component of its broader geopolitical strategy. With the Assad regime no longer in power, Tehran may attempt to establish a foothold by aligning with local communities opposed to al-Sharaa’s rule. By consolidating authority within the central government, al-Sharaa reportedly aims to limit Iran’s ability to manipulate local governance structures and exploit regional divisions to its advantage.[2] This concern is particularly relevant in Syria’s coastal regions, where Iran has recently been accused by many actors, of supporting violent attacks against transitional authorities to weaken them and strengthen its own influence.
From HTS’s perspective, a decentralized system could lead to internal disputes between regional authorities and Damascus and create new openings for Iran to assert its influence through its allied groups. By maintaining a strong central government, al-Sharaa seeks to prevent such fragmentation and curb Tehran’s ability to shape Syria’s political landscape.
Turkey and Iran’s differing positions on Syria’s transition have already strained relations between the two countries. Tensions escalated recently when Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan criticised Iran’s strategy towards Syria, warning against any attempts to destabilize the country and hinting that others might respond in kind. Tehran swiftly expressed its discontent, urging Ankara to avoid statements that could further damage bilateral ties. While both sides have since de-escalated the situation, Turkey-Iran relations will likely continue to be influenced by Iran’s response to Syria’s transition, both in governance and beyond.
So far, Tehran appears to be keeping its options open, including the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with Syria’s new authorities. If Iran prioritizes engagement and rebuilding ties, its destabilizing role is likely to remain limited, reducing the risk of friction with Ankara. However, should Iran decide to focus on fuelling instability, tensions with Turkey are expected to rise, given Ankara’s vested interest in maintaining stability in its neighbouring country.
Weighing the pros and cons
The feasibility of implementing either a centralized or decentralized governance system in Syria is fraught with complexities. Each model presents distinct advantages and formidable challenges, particularly in a post-conflict setting where diverse identities and long-standing grievances demand recognition and accommodation.
Centralization promises efficient governance, streamlined decision-making, and coherent and unified national policies. However, in a country where multiple identities and power centres have emerged, it risks exacerbating ethnic, sectarian and political divisions.
Over-centralization may breed resentment, alienating key stakeholders such as the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration and local opposition councils, potentially triggering renewed instability, governance paralysis, and even conflict relapse. Furthermore, Syria’s authoritarian legacy raises concerns that a highly centralized structure could perpetuate the same patterns of exclusion and repression that contributed to the conflict in the first place.
Conversely, decentralization offers a more adaptable governance model that can empower local communities, enhance regional representation, and align service delivery with local needs. It can help mitigate sectarian and ethnic tensions by ensuring that historically marginalized groups have a stake in the country’s future governance.
However, decentralization also poses difficulties, particularly in ensuring cohesion, preventing the fragmentation of the state, and addressing external actors’ influence over local authorities. The effectiveness of a decentralized model would depend on a robust legal framework, the equitable distribution of resources, and safeguards against secessionist tendencies.
The core challenge lies in striking a balance – establishing a governance model that fosters national unity while allowing for local autonomy. Failure to do so could result in a state that is either excessively centralized, deepening the alienation of key constituencies and provoking further unrest, or excessively fragmented and more vulnerable to internal divisions and both internal and external manipulation.
Not addressing the governance question through meaningful concessions during the recent national dialogue and constitutional declaration processes was a missed opportunity. Nonetheless, the newly appointed transitional government can still address this by launching an inclusive consultative process – one that reflects the aspirations of Syrians and lays the foundation for the new constitution.
Striking the right balance
For Syria’s transition to be both successful and sustainable, policymakers and stakeholders must prioritize an inclusive governance framework that balances national unity with regional autonomy. A well-structured system should preserve strong national institutions while empowering local authorities to address regional concerns effectively. Regardless of the governance model ultimately adopted, key reforms and measures must be implemented to ensure long-term stability and inclusivity:
- Institutional reforms: Strengthening transparency, accountability, and public participation is essential for a stable transition. Power-sharing mechanisms between central and regional governments should be established to prevent excessive concentration of power and ensure fair representation of Syria’s diverse political and ethnic groups.
- Legal and constitutional framework: A clear legal and constitutional framework should define the roles and responsibilities of both national and local governments. Establishing well-defined guidelines for resource allocation, law enforcement, and judicial authority is crucial to maintaining stability and preventing conflicts between governing bodies.
- Decentralized service provision: Empowering local governance structures to manage essential services such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure is vital. Strengthening local service delivery will help rebuild trust in government institutions and ensure that communities receive services tailored to their needs.
- Conflict resolution mechanisms: A national reconciliation process must be prioritized to address historical grievances and prevent further divisions. Independent mediation bodies should be established to resolve disputes between regional and central authorities, fostering a more cohesive and cooperative governance model.
A potential compromise between the new administration and communities advocating for a decentralized model could focus on embedding these principles into whatever system is adopted. This approach would move the discussion beyond disputed governance structures and instead foster consensus on a system that upholds core values, responsibilities and rights. By ensuring that governance reforms reflect the aspirations of all communities, Syria can build a more inclusive and stable system – one that strengthens regional engagement and agency while preserving national unity.
To avoid repeating past mistakes, Syria must build a system that is responsive, inclusive and reflective of its diverse communities, and capable of adapting to future challenges. This requires not only legal and institutional reforms but also a political culture that prioritizes cooperation, representation, and long-term stability over short-term political gains.
Ultimately, Syria’s post-Assad transition depends on a governance model that is both adaptable and sustainable. A rigid, one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to succeed. Instead, a pragmatic and flexible model – one that embraces national cohesion while respecting regional diversity – offers the best path to foster reconciliation, stability and prosperity.
Without a mutually accepted governance arrangement, Syria will remain a volatile flashpoint for regional rivalries, particularly between Turkey and Iran. Instability in Syria may extend well beyond its borders, sending shockwaves across the Middle East and threatening to destabilize the region’s already fragile security landscape.
[1] Author’s private conversation with Syrian officials, February 2025, Damascus, Syria.
[2] Author’s private conversations with Syrian officials, February 2025, Damascus, Syria.
This article is part of a policy series for the ‘Evolving Turkey–Iran relations and implications for regional reordering’ project of the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) network.
The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of the CATS Network, an international network of think-tanks and research institutions working on Turkey.
