Oman and Saudi Arabia are integrating youth and civil society into governance, but largely on the state’s terms. These are tightly managed attempts to sustain legitimacy amid economic transformation. While both states project inclusion, genuine accountability remains constrained by elite control and institutional limitations. Saudi Arabia, having restructured the leadership patterns among traditional elites under Vision 2030, has been more agile in reshaping its state–society model, though in a highly centralized and performative manner. Oman, by contrast, offers a more participatory and consultative approach through Vision 2040, but the continued dominance of older elites limits responsiveness to youth aspirations, as empowerment is managed in coordination with them.
In both cases, the key issue is not whether civic participation exists, but the extent to which that participation is actually shaping state policy, and –critically – the extent to which officials leading this process are accountable to the views of citizens. Both countries use education reforms, employment strategies, and national visions to integrate citizens into their future visions. Currently, this inclusion is largely symbolic. This raises an important question: will these models evolve into more credible accountability frameworks or remain top-down instruments of control? Ultimately, a failure to incorporate genuine accountability is likely to undermine the stability of both states.
Engaging youth through national visions
Oman’s Vision 2040 involved significant public input, including targeted outreach to youth and women. Forums and national labs facilitated structured dialogue with citizens, supported by public relations mechanisms that mediated engagement while preserving state authority. These forums created expectations for responsiveness and shaped a modest participatory culture. Though ultimately top-down, the process gave citizens a perceived stake in governance, even if their influence on outcomes remains limited.
In Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030 prioritizes youth as drivers of economic diversification, particularly in entrepreneurship, cultural industries and the tech sector. The state has permitted growth in non-political civic activity, such as volunteerism and youth clubs, expanding participation while limiting political discourse. The 2016 NGO law eased registration procedures for civil society organisations but retained restrictions on advocacy, reinforcing a framework where civil society contributes to service delivery more than policy accountability.
Both countries face significant demographic pressures. In Oman, the 2011 protests triggered job schemes and welfare benefits, but structural challenges persist: higher education institutions are misaligned with labour market needs, and public sector jobs are still preferred due to their stability. Similarly, in Saudi Arabia, education reforms and scholarship investments have not resolved youth unemployment, especially among women. Vision 2030 includes labour market reforms and vocational training, but private sector absorption remains patchy. While female young Saudis express optimism, they also seek greater transparency and predictability, especially regarding access to employment and long-term planning.
Women’s empowerment as a measure of reform
In both Oman and Saudi Arabia, women’s empowerment features prominently in state-led reform agendas, though primarily framed through socio-economic development rather than rights-based lenses.
In Oman, Vision 2040 incorporates gender equality goals and involves women in national consultations. However, political representation remains low, and activism is constrained. Despite state-led policy labs to reform women’s associations, they remain distant from advocacy and continue to function largely as instruments of state-led feminism. Women are active in sectors such as education and healthcare, but women rarely hold leadership positions. Recent gains, such as increased participation for women in Chamber of Commerce elections, indicate incremental improvements in civic visibility. But, civic engagement is mediated through top-down structures with limited space for independent advocacy. Omani women comprise some 60% of students in higher education and make up around 34.9% of the national workforce, with particularly strong representation in teaching and public administration.
Saudi Arabia has pursued more rapid and public facing reforms. Vision 2030 lifted restrictions, such as the driving ban and guardianship requirements in employment contexts. Women now represent over 58% of university graduates and around 36% of the labour force. These reforms are framed as economic necessity and part of a broader modernization agenda. A 20% quota in the Shura Council has improved the visibility of women. Yet, activism outside sanctioned venues remains criminalized. Nonetheless, women participate in consultative councils, chambers of commerce, NGOs and public boards, creating informal pathways of influence – albeit within tightly controlled parameters. Notably, the Kingdom has achieved its lowest female unemployment rate to date (3.3%). To support workforce absorption, the government has heavily invested in entrepreneurship and SME funding as alternative channels of inclusion.
In both countries, women’s inclusion is strategic and managed. While some reforms stem from elite vision, others are responses to societal expectations. Yet participation remains channelled through state-aligned platforms, limiting autonomy. Still, as women’s educational and professional contributions grow, these managed reforms may gradually recalibrate public expectations, posing a long-term challenge to the existing governance model.
Managing accountability: From consultation to control
Vision 2040 represents Oman’s shift from reactive governance toward proactive, long-term planning. Historically, policymaking was shaped by short-term concerns and elite negotiation. Today, forums like ‘Together Forward’ and digital platforms such as Tajawub offer avenues for citizen input. These tools generate a language of accountability, but they stop short of granting binding influence. The elected Majlis al-Shura has consultative authority but limited legislative authority, and policy decisions remain concentrated within the older political elites.
Civil society operates within semi-formal boundaries. Youth groups and volunteer associations contribute to social cohesion and local initiatives but avoid overtly political terrain. The state tolerates and sometimes co-opts this activity, reinforcing narratives of civic harmony. Yet generational frustration is quietly growing. Many young Omanis perceive a mismatch between participatory rhetoric and political opportunity, especially when national decision-making remains dominated by pre-2020 elites. The long-term credibility of Vision 2040 may depend on whether meaningful generational renewal occurs.
In contrast, Saudi Arabia has combined elite restructuring with a performance-based legitimacy model. The rise of a new technocratic leadership under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has allowed the state to pursue rapid reforms without altering its centralized structure. Vision 2030 is less about consultation than execution. Platforms like digital feedback portals and social media campaigns provide informal ways to register dissatisfaction, and in some cases, trigger state responses. But formal mechanisms for dissent or influence remain constrained.
NGOs are permitted to operate in charitable and development sectors but are barred from advocacy. Civic engagement is encouraged only when aligned with state-defined priorities. While stabilizing, it limits the system’s ability to channel social grievances constructively. Still, strategic reforms, particularly in jobs, women’s inclusion, and culture, help to address popular aspirations.
This raises a fundamental tension: can strategic state reform, when tightly controlled, serve the population’s evolving needs? In both countries, the answer remains ambiguous. Reforms are often ambitious but inconsistently implemented, raising the risk of ‘reform fatigue.’ Without transparent communication and credible participatory pathways, the gap between state performance and public expectations may widen.
A contained evolution of state–society relations?
While both countries are crafting narratives of inclusion, accountability remains elusive. Oman’s strategy leans heavily on procedural consultation, yet generational stagnation among political elites risks alienating its youth. Saudi Arabia’s top-down reforms, enabled by elite reshuffling, are more dynamic but rely on performance legitimacy rather than shared governance.
Neither model has yet moved beyond managed participation. If economic liberalization fails to deliver social mobility or equitable access to opportunity, the symbolic nature of reforms may erode the ruling elites’ legitimacy in the eyes of younger, better-educated citizens who increasingly expect accountability and transparency. In practice, this could lead to public disillusionment with state narratives of inclusion, particularly if lived experiences do not match reform promises.
For civic engagement to evolve meaningfully, both states must address structural limitations. This means shifting from state-curated dialogue to institutionalized mechanisms for citizen input, such as empowering elected bodies, enabling independent associations, and expanding youth representation. International partners can support this by investing in civic education, policy literacy, and consultative platforms that operate beyond government control. Hence, inclusion without accountability is fragile. Long-term stability in both Oman and Saudi Arabia will depend not just on economic diversification, but on governance models that reflect the agency of their younger generations.
