This article was written prior to the 12 June 2025 escalation between Iran and Israel.
Since 2003, Iraq has emerged as a battleground for Iranian and Turkish influence. These regional powers avoid direct confrontation, instead pursuing strategic rivalry channelled through local actors, while selectively cooperating on shared interests such as opposing Kurdish independence.
While major geopolitical disruptions in the broader Middle East – notably the fall of the Assad regime – have reshaped regional alignments and perceptions of power, the indirect nature of the Iran–Turkey rivalry in Iraq remains intact. These changes have intensified strategic anxieties in Tehran over Turkey’s expanding regional influence and the possibility it could deepen its involvement in Iraq. This prospect, though not yet realised, is a growing concern for both Iranian policymakers and their allies in Iraq.
Iraq remains Iran’s most critical arena for asserting regional influence and advancing economic interests, reinforced by its extensive, multilayered ties – particularly with Shia factions. Turkey, by contrast, has expanded its presence through growing trade relations and an increasingly assertive military footprint, especially in northern Iraq.
Several contextual factors sustain this pattern: the US presence that discourages escalation, and Iraqi actors who, despite being influenced by both Iran and Turkey, avoid deeper entanglement in regional conflicts. In this environment, Iran and Turkey are – and will remain – deeply embedded in Iraq’s fragmented political and communal landscape, cultivating local allies and manoeuvring within intra-Iraqi power struggles. Although both countries broadly support Iraq’s territorial integrity, they are engaged in an intensifying rivalry at the sub-state level, expanding their influence through local political, economic and security networks. This indirect competition not only deepens Iraq’s internal divisions but also constrains its capacity to function as a cohesive state.
Looking ahead, for Iraq, the central challenge will be whether Baghdad and Erbil can strengthen their cooperation to reduce dependencies on Ankara and Tehran, transforming Iraq from a battleground into a bridge between regional powers. The trajectory of this competition – and Iraq’s response to it – will have significant implications for regional stability and Iraq’s prospects for achieving greater sovereignty in a contested Middle East.
Rivalry and partnership through Intra-Kurdish politics
The long-standing rivalry between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has created natural openings for Turkey and Iran to exert influence in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Iran has leveraged its close ties with the PUK to preserve a strategic foothold in the KRI, offsetting Turkish influence and aligning the PUK with Iran-backed Shia factions in Baghdad – such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. Tehran has also supported the PUK’s pragmatic relationship with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in both Iraq and Syria, viewing it as a useful lever to counterbalance Turkish influence and pressure Ankara-aligned actors. These relationships enable Iran to reinforce its structural advantage in Iraq’s political system, particularly during government formation processes at both the provincial and national levels. Since 2017, Iran-aligned groups have also consolidated their presence in disputed territories, increasing the KRI’s reliance on Iran and giving Tehran leverage over Kurdish politics from within.
Turkey, by contrast, has cultivated a close and exclusive partnership with the KDP, treating it as a key interlocutor in advancing overlapping economic and security interests. Turkish commercial flights continue to operate to Erbil Airport, controlled by the KDP, while flights to Sulaymaniyah – within the PUK’s sphere – remain suspended, with Ankara accusing the PUK of links to the PKK.
Over the past decade, the KDP has gained the upper hand in the KRI, a shift advantageous to Turkey but one that has deepened internal Kurdish divisions – which both Ankara and Tehran exploit. Iran has responded by intensifying support for the PUK and other counterbalancing actors, particularly after the 2021 Iraqi elections, when the PUK joined Iran-aligned factions in opposing the KDP-Sadrist-Taqadum alliance. Tehran also signalled its red lines through missile strikes on Erbil since 2020, underscoring the risks the KDP faces if it drifts too far towards Turkey and the West.
For Turkey, the calculus is equally complex. Following the 2017 Kurdistan independence referendum – which Erbil conducted against Ankara’s advice – Turkey recalibrated its approach by gradually strengthening cooperation with Baghdad, even as it maintained a close relationship with the KDP. Turkey’s objective remains maintaining a stable, KDP-dominated KRI, as any shift towards Iran-backed political forces would alter the local balance in Tehran’s favour.
Despite backing rival Kurdish factions, Iran and Turkey found common ground in opposing the 2017 independence referendum – a moment of cooperation that highlights the situational nature of their partnership. This pragmatic convergence has reemerged in Baghdad and Ankara’s recent support for bypassing the KRI in the Development Road project, which links the Grand Faw Port to Turkey. The project’s initial route skirts the KRI, sidelining Erbil’s strategic and economic interests. In response, the KRG proposed an alternative route to integrate the KRI into the corridor, but there has been no progress towards adopting this version.
Turkey, for its part, has shown interest in accelerating the Development Road project’s implementation, viewing it as a strategic corridor for trade and regional influence. Iran’s position remains ambiguous, but some allied groups in Iraq have expressed dissatisfaction on the grounds that it will consolidate Turkish influence in the country. This pattern of indirect competition extends beyond Kurdish regions into Iraq’s Shia-majority heartland, where intra-Shia rivalries have created another key arena for Iranian dominance – and, increasingly, Turkish ambition.
Iran and Turkey in intra-Shia politics
In recent years, Iraq’s intra-Shia politics have been marked by deep internal rivalries. Traditional sectarian and ethnic divisions such as Shia versus Sunni or Arab versus Kurd no longer fully capture the country’s political dynamics. Tehran’s influence here is central to its regional strategy, anchored in long-standing relationships with Iraq’s Shia political establishment. While Iran’s relationships are often viewed through a sectarian lens, they extend beyond religious affinity to encompass broader strategic and economic interests. These multifaceted ties were further institutionalised following the 2003 US invasion and expanded during the fight against ISIS, when Iran-backed groups took control of strategic areas in northern and western Iraq. This tightened Tehran’s grip over political, security, and even economic dynamics, particularly in places like Kirkuk and Mosul.
Iran has positioned itself as a key mediator among rival Shia factions, shaping government formation processes and maintaining influence through a web of allied groups – many now central to the current Shia Coordination Framework. This system ensures Tehran’s strategic priorities remain protected even amid growing domestic and external challenges.
In contrast, Turkey’s ability to penetrate Shia-majority institutions remains limited. Lacking the ideological proximity that benefits Iran, Ankara relies on economic diplomacy and bilateral engagement with Baghdad – emphasizing trade, water management, and anti-PKK cooperation. However, deep-rooted mistrust stemming from Turkey’s historical support for Sunni factions continues to constrain its reach.
Turkey’s expanding security footprint is increasingly bringing it into indirect contestation with Iran-aligned groups across strategically sensitive areas. Iranian-backed militias now operate in Kirkuk, Mosul, Tal Afar, and Sinjar – territories where Turkish security interests are growing. These militias serve to exert pressure on US forces during periods of heightened tension and counterbalance Turkey’s expanding military presence in northern Iraq. By maintaining strong ties with armed groups active across these frontlines, Iran extends its influence beyond traditional Shia strongholds, complicating Ankara’s regional calculations.
Even so, Iran’s dominance within intra-Shia politics is no longer absolute. The 2019–20 protest movements and Muqtada al-Sadr’s 2021 bid to form a majority government –alongside the KDP and Taqadum – signal that resistance to Iranian influence from within the Shia community is emerging.
In response, Iran has doubled down on consolidating its influence by supporting the formation of a 2022 government composed largely of loyal factions. It sought to channel Iraq’s oil windfall through allied actors to reinforce its influence and reduce domestic economic pressures and unrest. At the same time, Tehran exploited fragmentation among Kurdish and Sunni parties to prevent the emergence of a unified opposition.
Despite rivalry across the region, both Iran and Turkey recognise that their economic stakes in Iraq require maintaining a degree of stability. The country is Turkey’s third largest export market and Iran’s second largest non-oil export destination. Both governments have publicly expressed an intention to expand trade further. These economic ties help to explain why both powers pursue a dual track of cooperation and rivalry with restraint and engage tactically when interests align.
Implications for regional dynamics and Iraq’s future
While regime change in Syria has disrupted traditional patterns in Turkey–Iran relations, Iraq remains the primary arena for their indirect rivalry. Turkey’s growing influence in Syria has emboldened Iraqi factions – most notably the KDP and several Sunni Arab groups – who are increasingly disillusioned with Iran. This shift has created new openings for Ankara to expand its influence.
However, in the KRI longstanding alignments persist: the KDP gravitates towards Ankara, while the PUK remains aligned with Tehran. Although these internal rivalries will continue to shape Kurdish politics, mounting economic pressures may incentivise both parties to deepen coordination with Baghdad in pursuit of access to federal resources.
Unlike Syria, Iraq holds greater strategic significance for Iran. Following setbacks in Syria and Lebanon, Tehran views the preservation of influence in Iraq as critical to its broader regional agenda. Iraq is not only Iran’s most significant regional outpost but a vital source of hard currency and a key conduit for fuel trade. In parallel to political influence, Iran maintains substantial deterrent capacity through aligned armed groups, many of which operate in areas vital to Turkey’s security interests. These groups constrain Turkish ambitions without triggering direct confrontation.
Iraq’s upcoming parliamentary elections in November are unlikely to produce a radically different government given current dynamics and coalitions, but they may intensify intra-communal divisions. The pre-election environment doesn’t suggest a shift in Iran–Turkey indirect rivalry, unless intra-communal divisions escalate to violence – as during the 2021-22 government formation process – thereby inviting deeper regional intervention.
More broadly, the indirect rivalry in Iraq is unlikely to cause a major shift in broader Turkey–Iran relations. Iraq is a more contained theatre than Syria, where tensions often escalate. However, external disruptions – particularly in Syria – can still intensify their rivalry inside Iraq by fuelling competition through allied groups. Paradoxically, the relative stability of this rivalry in Iraq, reinforced by significant economic interests, may serve a stabilizing function in broader bilateral relations.
For Iraq, its decentralised and fragmented power structure will persist. Iraqi political elites face mounting pressure to shift the country’s role from battleground to bridge between regional powers. However, this aspiration remains constrained by internal fragmentation. Iraq therefore remains vulnerable to the negative implications of the Turkey-Iran rivalry. To achieve greater sovereignty and agency, Baghdad and Erbil must strengthen cooperation, reducing their reliance on Ankara and Tehran. This cooperation – which would likely receive backing from the US and European partners – represents Iraq’s best chance to shape its own political future rather than remain subject to regional powers’ competing agendas.
This article is part of a policy series for the ‘Evolving Turkey–Iran relations and implications for regional reordering’ project of the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) network.
The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of the CATS Network, an international network of think-tanks and research institutions working on Turkey.
