In Morocco, youth-led protests have spread across several cities, organized through platforms such as TikTok and Discord. What began as outrage over reports that eight women died while giving birth at a public hospital in Agadir has evolved into a broader movement demanding better healthcare, education and jobs. One chant captured the public mood: ‘Stadiums are here, but where are the hospitals?’ – a criticism of government spending on World Cup infrastructure while essential services remain underfunded. Recent reports indicate that more than 2,400 protesters have been charged, highlighting both the scale of the mobilization and the state’s firm response. For Morocco and the wider MENA region, the protests underscore the limitations of a governance model that trades restrictions on political participation for stability and selective development.
Morocco’s model: promise and strain
For years, Morocco maintained a delicate balance between development and political control. The state invested in infrastructure, social protection programmes and renewable energy projects, which helped to maintain a sense of progress and stability. The World Bank records ‘notable advances in infrastructure and poverty reduction,’ but also ‘persistent challenges in job creation, inequality and quality of public services.’ These economic achievements have not been matched by political openness. Freedom House continues to rate Morocco ‘partly free’, citing restrictions on civic space, freedom of expression and political participation.
In Morocco – and across much of the region – the social contract is informal: citizens accept limited political and civic participation in exchange for stability and gradual development. It was tested in the Arab uprisings in 2011 and 2019, when demands for reform and accountability swept across the region. The Moroccan state weathered those moments through visible investment and measured openness – preserving a model that for years has been held up as a regional example of managed stability. Yet as expectations have risen and delivery has slowed – with the state prioritizing prestige projects like new stadiums amid deepening inequality – the arrangement is being tested again. Citizens are questioning whether the state is upholding its side of the bargain. The current protests reflect not only anger over hospitals and stadiums but a broader erosion of confidence in how the state responds to social needs. The lesson is clear: the social contract is a living negotiation; when the capacity to deliver weakens, frustration re-emerges.
Evolving forms of contention
Current events in Morocco are part of a broader regional pattern. Since the Arab uprisings of 2011 and again in 2019, contentious politics in MENA has evolved. Large-scale protests are harder to sustain amid shrinking civic space and tighter state control, but civic and social actors have adapted. Amid fewer channels for formal participation, citizens are turning to new arenas of engagement – such as environmental protection, digital rights and community-based services. These less contentious forms of resistance keep activists engaged while navigating repression and limited resources.
Environmental and land-rights activism has emerged as one of the few remaining routes to hold the authorities to account in Iraq and Yemen. In Iraq, local groups in Basra and Dhi Qar have mobilized around polluted rivers, shrinking farmland and the salinization of Shatt al-Arab, framing environmental damage as questions of politics and justice rather than a technical issue. Activists link water scarcity and pollution to corruption, mismanagement and the unequal distribution of resources – turning ecological degradation into a critique of governance. In Yemen, where conflict has eroded state institutions, youth collectives and community cooperatives raise environmental awareness, manage scarce water supplies and document land grabs by armed actors.
In Lebanon, where economic collapse and political deadlock have eroded public trust, civil society uses technology as a tool for accountability and survival. Organizations such as SMEX and the Maharat Foundation lead initiatives on digital rights and media literacy, training citizens to identify disinformation and protect their privacy online. Lebanon’s online space remains only ‘partly free,’ yet it still offers one of the few arenas where citizens can question power and rebuild civic trust through digital participation.
After protests in 2019, the government in Algeria has created new institutions and economic programmes to integrate young people. However, progress has been slow, and frustrations persist over limited political openness. Many young Algerians now channel their energy into entrepreneurship, technology and local development initiatives – using these spaces to push for accountability and participation. For example, Algerian youth have been debating on social media platforms to push for accountability and have started entrepreneurial projects to participate in the economy. They are now demanding greater investment in the limited programmes created after 2019.
In Sudan, where state institutions have collapsed under the weight of war, local resistance committees have become the backbone of community survival. Formed during the 2019 uprising, these networks now organize food distribution, medical aid and neighbourhood protection in cities such as Khartoum and Port Sudan. Many have evolved into informal governance structures, coordinating with humanitarian actors and documenting abuses. Despite targeted repression and ongoing conflict, these grassroots actors provide essential services and keep civic life alive in the absence of the state.
Before the recent protests, Morocco’s civil society was active mainly in cultural activities, local development, education and capacity-building. Activism was tolerated as long as it avoided direct political critique. But as living costs rose and public funds were directed towards prestige projects like the 2030 World Cup, many civic actors began questioning the state’s priorities. That frustration – especially among young people – helped turn quiet civic engagement into broader mobilization.
Politics of performance – a regional moment of reflection
The Moroccan government has promised to raise spending on health and education in the 2026 budget, a move that suggests it recognizes the depth of public frustration. Yet questions remain over whether these pledges will translate into real improvements, especially in rural and marginalised areas, where unemployment in rural zones stood at about 6.8% compared with 16.9% in urban areas in 2024. The current protests are Gen Z led, as most participants are too young to remember the 2011 protests, but they share similar grievances: economic exclusion, a sense of neglect and limited space to voice demands. The government can respond by tightening control – or it can use this moment to rebuild trust through inclusion and transparency.
Reports of state violence and mass arrests, even as the government pledges new spending, point to a dual strategy of response, offering selective concessions while reinforcing control. Tackling the roots of discontent through inclusive development and accountability, rather than repression, will be key to preventing deeper instability.
The return of contention in Morocco marks a moment of reckoning for its political model. It highlights the growing strain between rising social expectations and the limits of stability built on constrained freedom of expression. Across the region, the same question looms: how much can governments control without listening, and how much can societies endure without real participation? The answer will define the next decade of state–society relations in the Middle East. Morocco’s experience shows that performative and selective forms of progress cannot substitute for equitable development – and control, no matter how carefully managed, cannot replace participatory governance.
