Political fragmentation and instability have harmed Libya’s ability to manage its natural resources and mitigate the rising impacts of climate change. In 2019, the country was ranked among the top 25 most water-stressed nations worldwide by the World Resources Institute, and it faces mounting environmental challenges – from desertification and rising temperatures to frequent extreme weather events, such as 2023’s Storm Daniel.
The ongoing failure of the central government to address climate change risks puts lives in danger and threatens to exacerbate the country’s already fragile economic situation. Without a shift in approach, Libya will fall further behind in the global response to climate change. Empowering local government, civil society organizations (CSOs) and the private sector offers the most viable path forward. If executed properly, such an approach could unlock access to long-term programming and climate finance needed to make the climate transition possible.
Mega projects and neglect
In Libya, environmental mismanagement dates back to the era of the Gaddafi regime, when there was a reliance on mega projects such as the Great Man-Made River and Al-Kufra Agricultural Project to address climate challenges. Post-2011, poor management and neglect continued. The political focus after the revolution has been to lead Libya towards elections and a unified government; meanwhile, environmental challenges have received little attention.
Political fragmentation, lack of funding, and limited resources have hindered the development of climate adaptation and mitigation policies and initiatives. As a result, Libya has been unable to mount a meaningful, centralized response to climate change, even as its impacts have intensified.
Crisis management and an absence of climate planning
In the global context of climate governance, Libya still faces a complex challenge where climate policies are shaped by a reactionary crisis management approach. As a result of successive governments, armed conflict, and fragmented governance, environmental challenges have remained under the radar of policymakers, and Libya has gradually fallen behind in the global energy transition and climate action. This is reflected in the country’s growing absence from, or very limited participation in, regional and international climate change forums and negotiations.
At the national level, there has been little development of environmental projects with long-term tangible outcomes. Successive governments approached financial resource allocation through the lens of political survival rather than as an aspect of strategic planning. Climate related spending has been overlooked. In 2023, the Ministry of Defence and its affiliates, and the Ministry of Interior were allocated 4.34 billion dinars ($968.7 million) and 5.271 billion dinars ($1.17 billion) respectively, while the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Water received only 693.89 million ($154 million) and 64.97 million ($14.5 million).
Such a disparity is particularly striking in the light of disasters such as Storm Daniel, which devastated Derna and surrounding areas and resulted in major human and infrastructure losses. The magnitude of the storm’s impact reflected both climate and human-induced factors – particularly the absence of a clear national climate strategy – and demonstrated that without a system to address and monitor climate risks, citizens bear the brunt of both the direct and indirect losses incurred by climate events.
A distinct lack of coordination among local authorities further compounds the problem, with responses being isolated and fragmented. For instance, there are multiple water-related authorities – the General Water Company, the General Desalination Company of Libya, and the Great Man-Made River Project Authority, among others – but communication between them is poor and collaboration non-existent, which means efforts to address water challenges are ineffective.
The lack of coordination at the local level hinders the sharing of resources and best practices to address interlinked challenges, and it diminishes opportunities for collaboration with regional or international organizations. However, under the current circumstances local-level action presents the most realistic and flexible approach to towards meaningful progress on climate action.
Bridging the gap: the role of local actors
Communities have a deep understanding of the impact of climate change on their immediate environment. With capacity building they can develop locally adapted solutions, such as forestation initiatives using locally adaptive seeds, and establish a trusted space that will encourage other stakeholders to get involved.
In addition, Libya could utilize non-governmental channels to access international climate finance mechanisms, including the Green Climate Fund and the Loss and Damage Fund. In the case of Storm Daniel, international assistance focused on humanitarian relief, neglecting the disaster’s root causes.
Academic institutions in Libya also hold untapped potential. Universities and technical entities hold critical knowledge and technical skills that, in collaboration with municipalities and CSOs, could facilitate the timely and effective implementation of technical solutions.
The private sector can also play a vital role by providing financial and logistics support, including supplying equipment for forestation initiatives, such as Mountain Friends, waste management projects, or decentralised water solutions. By demonstrating social responsibility, the private sector could earn more of the public’s trust, which, in turn, could lead to greater favouring of private solutions.
How to get started: an effective response is a just response
Strengthening the role of CSOs and municipalities in climate adaptation would improve climate awareness and ensure climate solutions are community based and sustainable. Improving the technical capacities of local CSOs and municipalities through training facilitated by both local and international actors would enable localities to design and execute sustainable solutions to urgent environmental challenges, such as water scarcity and desertification.
Libya’s central authorities could also leverage existing competencies to improve communication with, and access to, international climate funds and funding agencies, including the World Bank and African Development Bank. This could include opening a dedicated climate finance office within the Ministry of Environment, which would manage engagement with both international funds and ensure national funds support local solutions dedicated to extreme heat resilience, desertification and floods.
Therefore, opening channels for climate finance to reach local NGOs through coordination with the Ministries of Planning and Environment or through the coordination with third-party actors is essential. Through this, Libya can receive climate adaptation and loss and damage funding to address crucial issues such as water scarcity and disaster preparedness. Moreover, local CSOs would benefit from intensive training on preparing climate finance proposals that meet the strict requirements of international climate funds.
In parallel, local environmental organizations and activists could establish a committee to organize joint action on organizing an independent union. This could strengthen the role of local environmental organizations not only on the ground but also at the political level. Initially volunteer-led, this platform could gain momentum over time to secure international support – which would grant the union tangible influence independent of fragile governmental bodies.
Libya’s environmental challenges require solutions that originate within the community in order to ensure meaningful environmental justice. Enabling local actors such as CSOs, academia, the private sector, and municipalities to take the lead is key to building a more locally sustainable, and just, climate response.
