In Iraq, outside of large-scale protest movements, I have witnessed two broad displays of social unity. Both emerged from football. The 2007 Asian Cup victory and Iraq’s World Cup qualification in April 2026 produced mass national celebrations that cut across sectarian and ethnic lines. In 2007, among family who had fled to Syria to escape the sectarian civil war, we joined night-long parades across Syrian cities where wartime fear briefly lifted. In 2026, I took part in celebrations in Baghdad at 8 am and then again that night, as US, Israeli and pro-Iranian drone strikes hit Camp Victory, Al-Qaim, Jurf al-Sakhar, Baghdad International Airport, and densely populated areas of the city. Analysts have tended to read such moments as purely cultural commentary. This misses the point. Football did not end either war, but the consistency of these eruptions of national joy – reproduced across nearly two decades, regardless of the violence surrounding them – demands political analysis, specifically in the context of declining public trust in the Iraqi state and growing disillusionment with its sectarian power-sharing system.
What 2007 revealed
Much has been written on 2007 – the way players were seen to be unifying a fractured country, and the power of broad public support rallying behind a singular Iraqi flag. The victory occurred amid countless tragedies: a bomb that killed 50 supporters before the final against Saudi Arabia, and the killing of the team’s physiotherapist just days before the tournament among them. Yet, counteracting all of this was a mother who had refused to bury her son until the Iraqi team won the trophy, a defiant act of solidarity meant to channel her grief into a gesture of national hope. What made the projection of unity so powerful was that it stood in direct opposition to the sectarian violence of the time.
The victory highlighted football’s ability to illuminate wider societal dynamics. The Asian Cup celebrations were understood by Iraqis as unambiguous and entirely their own, achieved without compromise with external powers and without sectarian calculation. That reading may be anecdotal, but it counteracts the dominant narrative of an Iraq defined solely by its divisions.
2026: the same joy, an evolving critique
The 2026 celebrations represent an evolution beyond simply denouncing sectarianism. They come in the aftermath of the Tishreen Movement, a movement against corruption and failing state services that called for a collective Iraqi society. In this context, celebrating the team’s accomplishments is more than an expression of anti-sectarian collectivism. It is a measured critique of the sociopolitical context in which they are taking place. Iraq’s anti-corruption stance predates Tishreen, most notably in the protests of 2015 and 2018 in Basra. While each movement followed its own trigger and specific grievance, such as unemployment, water pollution, and failing services, the 2026 celebrations must be read alongside these narratives.
These structural grievances have not been resolved. The rising unemployment and corruption that ignited Tishreen continues to fuel demonstrations as recently as May 2026. However, the political system has not responded in kind. The 2025–26 government formation has dragged on since November: the Coordination Framework nominated Nouri al-Maliki to the prime ministership, the US vetoed him, and eventually, a relatively unknown candidate, Ali al-Zaidi, emerged as the consensus choice – shaped by foreign vetoes and regional alignments, and notably not the winner of the 2025 election. This is not unusual in Iraq’s political system since 2003. While some at the top may view the euphoria of 1 April as room to breathe, it may be the opposite.
The national team is not immune to the political fractures it temporarily transcends. Tensions exist between expatriate and local players, with these distinctions used to question which players are more deserving of representing Iraq. Some players have publicly taken sides, while others have worked to quiet such divisions. The Iraqi Football Association (IFA) is not without its own corruption scandals. And yet, despite concerns around governance and internal IFA fractures, the team succeeded and was celebrated. Football did not require perfect harmony among players or a well-run association to produce national unity – simply a shared goal and the suspension, however temporary, of the corrupt and sectarian logic that divides Iraqi politics. If football can achieve this, the question now emerging for Iraq’s political elite is why they cannot.
The limits of euphoria
For the newly forming government of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, the World Cup qualification can be read as both a warning and an opportunity. The euphoria may appear to be dampening a quickly growing fire. However, football has shown, once more, that national accomplishment in the eyes of the public does not hinge on identity, only on a shared desire to better the country. When national interest is at the forefront, the sectarian makeup of who leads the charge becomes irrelevant. Despite the wide range of support Iraqi football enjoys, I have yet to see anyone discuss the ethnicity or sect of players Ayman Hussein or Ali Al-Hamadi when celebrating their goals against Bolivia that helped Iraq qualify. The sectarian power-sharing system is rapidly losing legitimacy, and these football accomplishments are further proof of where the priorities of Iraqis lie.
Policy lessons
Political leaders have the opportunity to recognise that public appetite for service delivery and national accomplishment, rather than sectarian quotas, has been building since at least 2007. Despite Iraq’s loss to Norway in its first World Cup match in 2026, the packed streets and cafes, and the powerful celebrations at 2 am when Iraq briefly equalised the score, point to this growing feeling that could define the next era of Iraqi politics.
Al-Zaidi’s government will need to act quickly. It has been granted some breathing room. A delayed return of summer heat is so far limiting the usual electricity grievances though damage to Iranian infrastructure – Iraq’s largest gas supplier – may make this year worse than most. At least two more World Cup matches lie ahead which, whatever the results, will recreate something of the national joy. But this window is narrow.
The new government will need to demonstrate accomplishments that are direct and visible, not solely symbolic. Relying on the cover provided by the regional war may not hold indefinitely when Iraqis facing rising unemployment, salary cuts, and failing services are being constantly reminded of what a unified group of their compatriots can accomplish when national interest is placed above sectarian calculation.
