Basra, Iraq’s port city and southern economic hub, is facing a severe water crisis despite the region’s wealth in natural resources. The country’s water scarcity is a multifaceted issue, influenced by the activities of upstream countries, population growth, and extreme weather events that have reduced the flow of water into the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Over the years, various efforts have been made to address Basra’s growing water needs, yet meaningful progress has been minimal.
Desalination is considered one of the more practical, long-term solutions for Iraq’s water future in the face of these difficulties. Nevertheless, the process of incorporating desalination into the country’s water-management policy has been complicated by political corruption leading to mismanagement, bribery and embezzlement, alongside an institutional set-up that causes infrastructure projects like desalination ones to be delayed or to end abruptly.
Desalination in Basra
Past governments failed to address Basra’s water crisis effectively or to implement sustainable solutions. Moreover, they did not hold oil companies accountable for exploiting Iraq’s water resources for oil production. Proposals for desalination have repeatedly been made but not implemented due to corruption and bureaucratic hurdles.
Governments have considered the idea of desalination for the oil industry for more than a decade. In 2010, the American company ExxonMobil developed a proposal for a project that would have supplied eight oil fields in the south with fresh water through a 270-kilometre line. The South Oil Company eventually took over the project’s management but it never saw the light of day due to disputes over the cost, estimated at $12 billion, and a three-year construction timeline.
Awarded in 2014, the Hartha desalination project was scheduled to be completed in 2016 but was not until 2019, at a cost of $115 million. Bureaucracy, corruption and overlapping institutional roles led to delays, with the Ministry of Finance requiring approval from the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Municipalities in charge of the development. This was complemented by accusations and tensions in the parliament between these ministries, as well as corruption accusations from the Integrity Commission. Despite the facility being operational, the construction of water distribution lines is not yet complete and will probably take years.
In 2023, the Al-Sudani government awarded Power China the deal to build one of the biggest desalination plants in the world at Al-Faw port as well as a power-generation station to supply it. The plant is set to produce 1 million cubic meters per day, meeting the potable-water needs of 3–4 million people in Basra. Efforts have been made to reduce bureaucracy through decentralization with the project moving from the Ministry of Construction and Housing to the Basra governorate. However, concerns remain over ongoing local political corruption and elite rivalries.
Another desalination project to be developed by TotalEnergy was commissioned as a part of the $27 billion multi-project deal in 2023. It is set to produce 5.2 million barrels of fresh water per day and to start operating by 2028. The project aims to further increase crude oil production utilising the water produced by desalination, however, there is a lot of doubt and delays already. The TotalEnergy project raises a lot of questions among experts as the initial ambitious agreement was signed in 2019 but was not commissioned until 2023.
Moving Forward
Effective and substantial reforms when dealing with infrastructure projects requires understanding the embedded causes of corruption within the institutional framework of Iraq’s system of political power-sharing known as muhasasa. The appointment of senior officials is based on party affiliation rather than competence, which leads to unqualified individuals occupying key positions. The turnover of ministry staff after elections also erodes institutional knowledge, leaving ministries unable to keep to strategic project plans. Every incoming administrative staff prioritizes a new political agenda. If previous projects are any indication, the government must establish a transparent bureaucratic system and an anti-corruption framework, enhance auditing procedures, and have a transparent strategy for project programming that includes the full bidding process and clear contract obligations.
Reforms to combat corruption should include changing the existing accountability mechanisms. The current integrity committees, which are responsible for overseeing the implementation and funding of public projects, and for ensuring compliance and accountability, are composed of ministry employees, making them more susceptible to bribery. Third-party independent committees co-managed by Iraqi officials and foreign companies according to international criteria for financial audits and project oversight would be less vulnerable to local political pressure since the latter would have an international reputation to uphold. The government also needs to establish a central management base committee to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure projects. This committee would make sure that funds go to prioritized projects that have a strategic long-term national impact, regardless of the ministries’ current political agenda.
Additionally, the parliament has to take the initiative to update legislation to ensure there is a robust environmental framework that prohibits public and private entities from abusing natural resources, along with a National Water Allocation Framework to control water use. This would prioritize demand for agricultural and public consumption over industrial use, with strict water tariffs for oil firms.
International organizations can also play a role in improving the management of Iraq’s water supply. While they have provided financial support, technical advice and capacity development, they have fallen short in translating these efforts into tangible results. For example, the World Bank’s National Water Strategy for Iraq was developed to serve as a comprehensive framework for managing water resources but, despite detailed research carried out, it remains a paper exercise and there has been little implementation.
International organizations should work with ministries to ensure that water-management strategies are translated into actionable projects with clear timelines and follow-up. If desalination projects are well executed, with strong governance and environmental protections, this would lead to better water security for Basra and all of Iraq.
This article is part of a series from Chatham House that provides in-depth insights into the inner-workings of Iraq’s government and evaluate what recent developments – both public and behind the scenes – reveal about prospects for a more a stable, accountable and prosperous Iraqi state.
This series is part of the workstream on the political economy of reform, under the Middle East and North Africa Programme’s Iraq Initiative, led by project director Dr Renad Mansour.
