Libya’s vast southwestern Fezzan region is vital to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar as he strives for financial independence and international recognition. Having become the unequalled military authority in the region, Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) are steadily encroaching on government prerogatives to capture local markets and revenue flows. Critical to these efforts are the development of Haftar’s ties with military juntas and armed groups in Sudan and across the Sahel to influence transnational economic and security dynamics. The advance on strategic borderlands gives Haftar and his domestic allies considerable political leverage on the diplomatic scene and shapes their strategy for regional cooperation.
LAAF-led militarization and economic entrenchment
In January 2019, the LAAF used its firm control of eastern Libya to make a decisive move into the Fezzan, shortly before launching an offensive on the capital, Tripoli. Although it was pushed out of northwest Libya in 2020, the LAAF has since been able to consolidate its hold throughout the Fezzan. Under Haftar’s leadership, the army is set on a course of supplanting civilian authority and monopolizing economic activity to ensure its financial independence and ability to distribute wealth to its networks of allegiance and its social base. The transformations that this action has already generated in the east are increasingly manifest in the Fezzan.
At first, the LAAF tapped into the region’s deeply entrenched transnational trade and smuggling networks, taking over existing business extortion schemes. Increasingly, it also infiltrated the formal economy – primarily in agriculture and infrastructure. The Military Investment Authority, a vehicle through which the LAAF has seized public and private assets in eastern Libya, first made moves on the Fezzan’s state-led crop farms in 2018, but the political context at the time did not allow for a full takeover.
In 2024 the LAAF embarked on a mission to overhaul the Fezzan’s decrepit public infrastructure, in the process ushering in a boom in construction with considerable local support. Dozens of projects have begun in Sebha, Murzuq and Brak al-Shati, spanning roadworks, rehabilitation of education and medical facilities, and housing construction. Officially, the Benghazi-based rival government is steering the recovery plan, but real authority is vested in Haftar, his sons, and a cohort of loyal commanders and business actors. Two of Haftar’s sons spearhead the two agencies that replaced the Military Investment Authority: the National Development Agency, which emerged in 2023 as a civilian entity associated with Saddam Haftar’s Tareq Ben Ziyad Brigade; and the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, established by law in February 2024 as a super-agency for public works under the leadership of Belgassem Haftar. The two agencies have competed for contracts in southern Libya to the point of requiring third party mediation. Such dynamics reveal the developing level of competition between Haftar’s sons for primacy, but also hint at the importance of expanding the LAAF’s influence into Libya’s south and beyond.
Consolidation in the Fezzan
When major LAAF contingents deployed to the Fezzan in 2019 on the premise of combating organized crime and foreign militancy, the public response was largely favourable, and many residents find that security has improved since. The incorporation of local armed groups into the LAAF and aligned law enforcement agencies reduced the incidence of clashes and enhanced security coordination. With more police patrolling the streets, violent crime dropped, and business activities picked up. However, there is tangible frustration about predatory practices that contrast with the LAAF’s law and order narrative. Residents of Al-Gatrun and Tajarhi – two of the most remote southern settlements south of Sebha – demonstrated in 2023 and 2024 to denounce the excessive taxation of merchandise at LAAF-controlled checkpoints and the consequent surge in consumer prices. The retailing of fuel at inflated prices also stirs discontent, and while the LAAF introduced a consumer allowance system to monitor distribution to the Fezzan, it simultaneously allows fuel to be smuggled across the southern borders.
Khalifa Haftar’s pledge to prioritize development and put an end to the Fezzan’s marginalization raised local expectations. When heavy rainfall flooded the region in September 2024 and damaged almost 2,000 buildings in Sebha, numerous appeals for help were directly addressed to him and his sons. But after decades of disinvestment and destructions, overhauling the Fezzan’s decrepit public infrastructure would require a comprehensive masterplan, and questions have arisen on how sustainable the current development effort really is. Delays in the rehabilitation of schools in Sebha made for a chaotic start into the current academic year. Adding to the opacity surrounding funding sources, mismanagement and poor execution hamper some of the projects already under way. They are implemented by a multitude of Libyan and foreign companies, some of which have no public track record, and it is unclear whether any competitive bidding takes place. Critics note that the construction business is highly profitable and coveted for personal gain.
Infrastructure development has the potential to foster peace in the conflict-ridden region. In Murzuq, the reconstruction of destroyed neighbourhoods under Belgassem Haftar’s fund is creating incentives for Tebu and Ahali to normalize relations after their six-year conflict. In September 2024 the two communities reached a milestone truce deal under the patronage of the LAAF and Eastern government. But while some of the displaced Ahali are returning to their newly renovated homes, unaddressed demands for justice and contention over power sharing threaten prospects for peaceful coexistence.
Gains under the LAAF have come at a clear cost: space for public debate and scrutiny has shrunk dramatically. With a recent convergence of interests between Libya’s rival political authorities to quell any form of dissent, internal security agencies are cracking down on civil society and curtailing civil liberties across the country. In the Fezzan this has led to a string of arrests and the shutdown of numerous non-governmental organizations, largely silencing activists and citizen reporters. In this atmosphere the Haftar clan’s overt self-promotion has reached new levels: while Belgassem and Saddam Haftar take turns at hosting delegations and conferences in the Fezzan, propagandistic billboards invade the public space.
A springboard for regional influence
With LAAF control over the Fezzan largely consolidated, the Haftars are now seeking to use Libya’s south to expand their influence across Libya’s borders. The LAAF now has access to almost all of Libya’s land borders, enhancing its ability to monitor and potentially manage cross-border movements, and bolstering its influence over migration and regional security dynamics. This added leverage is likely to be beneficial in managing relationships with European governments, but also as Haftar develops new regional alliances.
In addition to cultivating their long-standing relations with Egypt, the Haftars are actively engaging with the newly established military juntas in the Sahel. Over the past year, Saddam Haftar has spearheaded multiple visits to countries in Africa, including Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, whose new leaderships have formed a trilateral alliance to shift away from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The LAAF’s engagement in the region is happening against the backdrop of increasing Russian influence throughout the Sahel. The Wagner Group, now Africa Corps, are longtime partners of the LAAF.
In June 2022, with unanimous backing from the LAAF, the Chadian head of the Military Transitional Council, Mahamat Déby initiated a military campaign to push rebel forces out of gold-rich territories along the joint borders. The offensive left these groups scattered across the desert, cutting them off from resources that they had relied on to fund their operations. The alliance between the Haftars and Déby reflects a mutual interest and marks a regional security shift that could influence the Sahelian states’ emerging alliance. This security-driven rapprochement positions the LAAF to deepen ties with Chad and Niger.
The alliance could open channels for significant economic exchanges. Russia is expanding into the Sahel via the Libya corridor. Its Africa Corps is already involved in illicit gold mining and resource extraction in the Central African Republic, Sudan and Mozambique. It could seek to tap vast gold prospects in northern Chad and northeastern Niger, regions adjacent to the Fezzan borders. This move would affect regional dynamics and further bolster security-driven economies in the area.
The LAAF is also promoting bilateral and multilateral infrastructure projects, notably two distinct highways connecting Chad, Libya and Egypt. Road construction has already been launched from Sirte by the National Development Agency. The transnational roads will offer the potential for stronger trade relations but will also increase security cooperation at the borders, raising the prospect of an alignment of economic and military actors across the Sahel. Such an environment is likely to prove advantageous to countries seeking to boost their engagement in the area, such as Russia and Turkey.
This article was produced with support from the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) research programme, funded by UK International Development. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.
