Since the ouster of the Assad regime in December 2024, the transitional authorities in Damascus have repeatedly vowed to sever Hezbollah’s reliance on Syria as a key smuggling corridor. For over a decade, it is reported that the group has freely moved drugs, money, and weapons through Syrian territory to finance and arm itself. In an effort to translate promises into action, the new authorities have ramped up security along the border with Lebanon, dismantled drug trafficking infrastructure, and intercepted arms shipments destined for Hezbollah.
While these measures have likely disrupted Hezbollah’s operations completely, eradicating smuggling remains an immense challenge. Hezbollah’s entrenched networks, the economic drivers of illicit trade, the transitional authorities’ limited security capacity, and the sheer scale of the porous border all make total elimination unlikely. Without a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy, cross-border smuggling will persist in post-Assad Syria.
Disrupting Hezbollah networks
Given its longstanding alliance with the Assad regime and direct involvement in the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah has become a prime target for the country’s new leadership. Despite the group’s withdrawal following Assad’s fall, the transitional authorities have taken a firm stance against Hezbollah-linked smuggling. Since Assad’s defeat, they have reportedly intercepted 13 weapons shipments bound for Hezbollah and arrested individuals involved in arms smuggling. They have also seized large quantities of narcotics and shut down drug production facilities across central and southern Syria.
On 6 February 2025, the crackdown escalated with the launch of a large-scale security operation in Qusayr, a strategic Hezbollah stronghold near the porous Syrian–Lebanese border. The operation targeted over a dozen villages that had remained under Hezbollah’s control and are home to Lebanese Shia families with longstanding ties to the group.
Syria’s Ministry of Defence stated that the campaign aimed to sever key smuggling routes in this critical region, which, according to the Homs border security chief Major Nadim Madkhana, had served as ‘an economic lifeline for Hezbollah and traffickers of drugs and arms.’ In fierce battles lasting several days, security forces uncovered more than 15 drug production facilities, stockpiles of illicit materials, and a counterfeit currency printing press producing fake $100 bills.
Interwoven challenges
Despite the recent successes of the transitional authorities, Hezbollah-linked smuggling operations are unlikely to end soon. Several key factors ensure their persistence. The 330-kilometre Syrian–Lebanese border remains inherently difficult to monitor. Much of it is unmarked and winds through valleys and mountains – terrain long exploited by drug smugglers and arms traffickers.
Compounding this challenge, Hezbollah has spent over a decade entrenching its presence along the border, building an extensive network of covert paths and tunnels to facilitate illicit activities. This deeply rooted infrastructure makes it nearly impossible to eliminate smuggling routes through security operations alone. The group also maintains a firm grip on the Syrian side of the border, particularly in the Beqaa Valley.
Additionally, Hezbollah’s long-standing ties to local smuggling networks bolster its ability to sustain cross-border operations. These networks reportedly include whose members operate on both sides of the border and have deep affiliations with Hezbollah. Heavily armed and well-resourced, these families have been engaged in smuggling for generations and possess intimate knowledge of the terrain. By leveraging their expertise, resources, and adaptability, these local networks can quickly respond to security crackdowns, including by relocating to areas inside Lebanon when targeted by Syrian authorities and vice versa. In addition to identifying alternative routes when necessary, smugglers are strengthening their operations by employing more sophisticated evasion tactics, such as concealing illicit substances within legitimate goods.
Furthermore, Syria’s deepening economic crisis, widespread unemployment, skyrocketing living costs, and high demand for both legal and illicit smuggled goods make smuggling an increasingly essential lifeline for border communities.
The capacity problem
Syria’s fragile security situation and the limited capacity of its new authorities present significant challenges to achieving their stated objectives. Despite toppling the Assad regime in just 11 days, the new leadership – led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – lacks the military and security infrastructure needed to effectively govern and secure the vast territories left in the regime’s wake. While efforts are underway to strengthen their capabilities, this process will take time.
Militarily, the HTS-led coalition remains fragmented. Although HTS, as Syria’s de facto ruling force, has persuaded most armed factions to merge under the Ministry of Defence, this unity is largely superficial. Many factions continue to operate under their original command structures, limiting overall cohesion and effectiveness.
Security forces are even more constrained. The new authorities primarily rely on HTS-linked General Security, an understaffed and overstretched force that functions more like an armed crisis response unit than a fully operational security apparatus. As a result, it lacks the resources to effectively monitor the border with Lebanon or combat the operations run by various networks, including Hezbollah’s.
The situation is similarly dire in Lebanon, where security forces also struggle with capacity issues. Their presence in Hezbollah strongholds – especially in the Beqaa Valley – is minimal to non-existent.
A broader strategy is needed
Syria’s new authorities have shown clear determination to disrupt Hezbollah’s illicit smuggling networks, particularly those involving weapons and drugs. As the transitional government builds capacity, Hezbollah’s cross-border operations will face increasing risks. However, eliminating the group’s ability to use Syria as a smuggling corridor will remain a formidable challenge – at least through military means alone.
A lasting solution requires a comprehensive strategy rooted in strong coordination between Syrian, Lebanese, and international actors. Beyond bolstering border security, efforts must address the root causes of smuggling by curbing demand for both illicit and legal contraband while investing in economic development programmes that offer viable alternatives to those who rely on smuggling for survival. Without these measures, Hezbollah’s entrenched networks will continue to exploit Syria’s vulnerabilities, deepening instability within the country and threatening broader regional security.
This article was produced with support from the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) research programme, funded by UK International Development. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.
