In an increasingly uncertain geopolitical landscape and amid intensifying competition between key powers, countries in the region are adjusting their foreign policy approaches in response to shifting power dynamics. These shifts are driven by several factors, including US–China tensions, global fragmentation, ongoing regional rivalries and pronounced instability. In the absence of a comprehensive regional security and cooperation framework that brings together major actors such as Israel, Iran, Turkey and the Gulf states, countries have turned to minilateral initiatives and strategic connectivity projects to enhance their security, economic sustainability and political stability. Today, the Middle East is awash with cooperation schemes, from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) investments to the US-led Abraham Accords and I2U2 Group to connectivity projects such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), Iraq Development Road Project and the North-South Transport Corridor, among others. However, because these initiatives rest on an exclusive and containment-based logic of the regional order they continue to enhance rather than resolve regional competition.
This competitive dynamic is particularly evident in the evolving roles of Iran and Turkey. Both are actively navigating global and regional shifts while vying for influence in their immediate neighbourhood and beyond. Though each has a different experience of, and approach to, regional strategic initiatives, both seek to reduce external interference in the regional order – Turkey by promoting regional ownership and Iran by pursuing a revisionist notion of a regional order that minimizes the US’s role. Understanding Ankara and Tehran’s divergent objectives offers insight into the competing logic and strategies shaping the region today, and why the prospect of a shared vision may be so difficult to achieve.
Turkey’s vision: regional order through regional ownership
Turkey has not had a static view of a regional order; nor have its threat perceptions remained unchanged. Nonetheless, certain aspects of its position in regard to the future of the Middle East remain fixed, notably its support for a regional order shaped by regional powers’ interests rather than the policies of external actors, such as the US and China. Ankara’s backing, alongside other actors, of connectivity projects founded on regional ownership, such as the Middle Corridor and Iraq Development Road Project, crystallizes Ankara’s vision for the regional order. Unlike Iran, Ankara does not altogether oppose the US’s role and presence in the region. However, it rejects what it sees as the US’s Israel-centric view of the regional order, and has voiced its opposition to US-supported initiatives such as the Abraham Accords and IMEC, which in Turkey’s view are based on a strategy of containment and exclusion.
The regional context has significantly shaped Turkey’s view of, and approach to, its neighbourhood. Prior to 2011, Ankara pursued a policy of gradualism, focused on cultivating closer relations with ruling elites and fostering deeper economic integration within its neighbourhood. During the Arab uprisings, Turkey shifted its approach, supporting popular demands for political transformation in regional states, believing that this would lead to a more legitimate regional order – one in which Turkey could assume a leading role while diminishing the influence of external powers
However, this strategy did not yield the desired results and led to Turkey’s isolation. This outcome, coupled with shifting geopolitical currents, prompted Ankara to recalibrate. By 2020-21, it had returned to its earlier approach, prioritizing its economic interests and cultivating more cooperation with regional governments and elites.
Connectivity and influence: Turkey’s strategic corridors
Since that time, the Middle East has witnessed the launch of various minilateral initiatives, including three spearheaded by the US: the Abraham Accords (2020), I2U2 (2021), and IMEC (2023). Turkey has been a vocal critic of these, arguing that they promote a regional order centred on Arab–Israeli cooperation bolstered by US support – excluding Turkey, Iran, and the Palestinian issue – and claiming that they prioritize Israeli normalisation over the interests and aspirations of Arab states. From Ankara’s perspective, this vision is not only inimical to Turkish interests but lacks the regional ownership and legitimacy that Ankara sees as essential to a functional regional order.
In contrast, Turkey’s own initiatives are primarily driven by its own interests and vision of a regional order. Together with other regional actors, Ankara has spearheaded two major connectivity projects: the Iraq Development Road project and the Middle Corridor. Both seek to leverage Turkey’s geographic location to strengthen its economy and its regional strategic importance by building two trade routes, the first linking the Indian Ocean to Europe via Iraq and Turkey, and the second Europe to China through Central Asia, South Caucasus and Turkey. However, these projects are also facing certain challenges and risks, such as financing, Iran’s exclusion and/or Russia’s circumvention.
Both projects are underpinned by the logic of regional ownership, particularly the Iraq Development Road Project, whose key stakeholders are Iraq, Qatar, Turkey, and the UAE. The Development Road presents itself as the most cost-efficient route between the Indian Ocean and Europe, while the Middle Corridor offers the shortest land route between China and Europe. Neither project is based on the strategic and geopolitical interests of any external power or their perspective on the regional order, nor on the logic of containment towards any regional actor. However, both projects bypass some key actors. The Development Road sidelines Iran and Iraqi Kurdistan while the Middle Corridor purposefully circumvents Russia.
While there is potential for the Development Road to eventually expand links to Iran and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq (KRG), doing so may trigger complications: European actors have thus far been ambivalent towards the project; Iran’s inclusion might further dampen their appetite. Similarly, whether the route can extend into Iraqi Kurdistan will depend on the evolution of Turkey–KRG relations and regional Kurdish politics. The Development Road also faces other vulnerabilities, including the volatile security landscape in Iraq – which is compounded by the exclusion of Iran – as well as financing concerns. The first phase and second phases are projected to cost around $17 billion and $38 billion, respectively.
The Middle Corridor, as a multimodal connectivity project, has two important advantages, particularly for Europe: it is the shortest land route between China and Europe, and it bypasses Russia. This latter feature has become more attractive after the invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions on Russia, which led to a considerable drop in cargo volumes along the Northern Corridor connecting China with Europe via Russia and Belarus. Indeed, since the war began, the Middle Corridor has seen a significant jump in traffic. Despite this, China and Europe remain hesitant to embrace the project as fully as they could. That ambivalence stems in part from discrepancies between legal frameworks and customs regimes among the participating countries as well as infrastructural mismatches and the corridor’s amorphous nature in general – whether it is a transit route, logistical hub, or a region-building initiative is not clear. Plus, given Russia’s entrenched influence in Central Asia, the South Caucasus and the Black Sea, circumventing Moscow might prove more challenging than assumed. Therefore, Russia’s exclusion is both an asset and a potential vulnerability.
Tehran’s vision: a multipolar region on Iran’s terms
Iran’s vision for the regional order is shaped by its ambition to reshape existing dynamics, establish a more prominent role for itself, and respond to perceived security challenges. Since the 1979 revolution, Tehran has sought to advance a revisionist order free from external – particularly US – influence. It advocates for a multipolar environment where regional actors manage their own security and political affairs. This perspective is embedded in Iran’s perception of itself as a major civilisational power, its aspiration to be a key decision-maker in the region, and a four-decade-long adversarial relationship with the US. The Iran-Iraq war and US-led containment and sanctions policy have entrenched a paranoid, isolated worldview within the Iranian system. In response, Tehran has sought to circumvent isolation by expanding its regional networks and forging stronger geostrategic ties, both regionally and with Russia and China.
Central to Iran’s strategy is its ‘axis of resistance’ – a network of non-state actors and allied states like Hezbollah, Hamas, and formerly the Assad regime in Syria. This network has served Tehran as an instrument for projecting regional power, countering American and Israeli presence and, prior to Hamas’ October 7th attacks on Israel and the war in Gaza, deepening Iran’s strategic reach across the Levant. The Palestinian issue is central to Iran’s regional narrative, with consistent condemnation of Israel and support for Palestinian groups used as justification for its broader resistance framework.
Looking outwards and eastwards: Iran’s partnerships and regional pushback
Tehran views connectivity projects as increasingly important for countering US sanctions, and shoring up its own strategic and economic standing and broader security. Iran’s strategic location at the intersection of several key regions – the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and the Caucasus – positions it favourably to capitalize on various initiatives and bolster economic growth, trade relationships, and overall regional sway. Yet, while Turkey has prioritized regional projects and partnerships, Iran has drawn more on external ties with Russia and China to advance projects aligned with its vision of a new regional order.
Iran actively participates in initiatives such as the International North-South Transport Corridor, which aims to link India, Iran, Russia, and Europe, viewing it as a vital alternative trade route that bypasses traditional chokepoints and enhances its role as a key transit hub. Since the war in Ukraine, Tehran has also forged stronger defence and economic ties with Moscow, signing a 2025 treaty aimed at bolstering trade and security cooperation.
Similarly, Iran has sought to benefit from China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In 2021, it signed a 25-year cooperation agreement that envisioned up to $400 billion in Chinese investment, though some of this has failed to materialise due to Beijing’s compliance with US sanctions. Iran has also sought full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which includes China, Russia, and several Central Asian nations, and in 2024 it joined the BRICS grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Both alliances seek to deepen cooperation on political, economic, and security issues to promote a multipolar global order. These initiatives have yet to yield the economic or strategic security that Iran seeks, but they do offer Tehran a buffer against US containment and sanctions.
However, Iran’s connectivity ambitions face regional pushback. Initiatives like IMEC or the Abraham Accords are viewed in Tehran as overtly exclusionary and adversarial. It is particularly concerned about the potential for increased Israeli security and intelligence cooperation with Gulf states that have signed the Abraham Accords, viewing this as a direct threat to its own security. Both initiatives are perceived by Tehran as US-led attempts to contain and isolate Iran and strengthen Israeli integration into the region. Through its support of the resistance axis, Iran has tried to slow down Israel’s integration in the region. On its northern border, Iran faces an additional challenge from Azerbaijan’s Zangezur corridor – the result of Azerbaijan’s gains in the war with Armenia. The project aims to build a direct land route connecting Azerbaijan, Turkey, Asia and Europe at the expense of Iranian access.
No common ground: why order remains elusive
The evolving strategies of Turkey and Iran reflect both the fragmentation and fluidity of the current Middle Eastern order, where traditional power structures are being challenged by competing visions, strategic connectivity projects, and shifting global alliances. While both countries seek to assert regional leadership and reduce external dependence, their divergent approaches – Turkey emphasising regional ownership and integration, and Iran promoting a resistance-driven model – underscore the competing logics shaping regional initiatives. These overlapping and often exclusive projects, instead of fostering collective security or cohesion, further entrench competition, making a stable and inclusive regional order more elusive.
This article is part of a policy series for the ‘Evolving Turkey–Iran relations and implications for regional reordering’ project of the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) network.
The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of the CATS Network, an international network of think-tanks and research institutions working on Turkey.
