The US–Israel war on Iran has exposed the fragility of civic space in Iraq. Security threats against civil society groups and restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly are longstanding features of Iraq’s civic environment. However, the conflict has intensified these pressures: as armed actors have expanded their influence, state institutions have weakened further, and public discourse has become increasingly polarized. In this environment, civic actors – particularly those engaged in accountability work or perceived as neutral during conflict – have been increasingly targeted, as scrutiny of political and security actors is more readily framed as disloyalty or foreign alignment, particularly with the US.
This dynamic has been reflected in recent incidents involving journalists who were covering war news. In April 2026, for example, Iraqi journalist Mustafa Alshimari was severely beaten by a group of protesters while covering demonstrations outside the Kuwaiti consulate in Basra, after being accused of political bias. In a separate incident in the same city, journalist Noor Al-Temimi was physically assaulted and had her phone confiscated while reporting on the aftermath of a strike targeting an Iran-aligned armed group. Such incidents illustrate how scrutiny and reporting during periods of conflict are increasingly framed as political positioning, exposing civic actors to intimidation and violence. Amid growing regional escalation, there is an urgent need to reform institutions governing civil society and strengthen support for civic actors to restore meaningful accountability in Iraq.
Pre-existing constraints on civil society
Iraq‘s civic space was already heavily constrained before the US–Israel war on Iran. Both state and non-state actors contributed to this environment, but armed groups have been a particularly persistent threat. During and after the 2019 Tishreen protests – when Iraqi people mobilized against corruption and poor governance – threats against activists, killings, and abductions carried out with impunity created a climate of fear that narrowed civic action and weakened accountability efforts.
These pressures intensified in 2020 following the US killing of Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad, which heightened tensions between pro-Iran armed factions and accountability actors, who were increasingly suspected by armed groups of being associated or affiliated with the US. The 2020 assassination in Baghdad of Hisham al-Hashimi – an adviser to Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi and a prominent security and armed groups analyst – and of activist Reham Yacoub in Basra the same year, are emblematic of this pattern. Each was targeted in part for their sustained criticism of armed group influence. The release in 2024 of the convicted killer of al-Hashimi by Baghdad Criminal Court, despite his confession, reinforced concerns over impunity and highlighted the weakness of the justice system relative to armed groups.
In the years that followed, accountability actors operated in a more politicized environment in which engagement with international actors was routinely framed by armed groups as evidence of foreign alignment. This dynamic further narrowed the space for accountability work even before the recent conflict.
The state has also played a direct role in restricting civic space. The government has used legal provisions – including Articles 433, 215 and 220 of the Iraqi Penal Code – to target activists, journalists and online critics under offences such as ‘public decency’ and ‘indecent content.’ The 2025 arrest of Ali al-Abbadi, director of the Iraqi Center for Human Rights, reportedly in connection with his accountability reporting and pursued under Article 433, further illustrates how such work had itself become a basis for retaliation. Cultural and civic activities have not been exempt: the Nasiriyah Reads Festival, an annual literary event in southern Iraq, was banned on security grounds and its organizer arrested in February 2026, a development that signals the growing restrictions on public space and freedom of expression more broadly.
NGOs have faced similar pressures, including increased scrutiny of funding, particularly foreign funding, and interference in their operations through the Directorate of NGOs. These constraints have pushed organizations towards self-censorship and reduced visibility, weakening their ability to promote accountability.
The forces driving the shrinking of civic space share a common logic: powerful actors seeking to resist scrutiny, to avoid accountability and to preserve elements of the post-2003 political order, in which demands for reform are often cast as destabilizing. The Tishreen protests heightened this defensive posture, making authorities more determined to prevent similar mobilization in the future.
Civil society under war conditions
The US–Israel war on Iran made an already constrained civic environment in Iraq significantly more dangerous. The confrontation between the US and Iran-backed armed groups played out partly on Iraq’s territory, making accountability work more politically fraught. Criticism of armed faction influence, opposition to aligning Iraq with Iran, or scrutiny of weapons held outside state control could expose activists to heightened risks.
The assassination of women’s rights activist Yanar Mohammed on 2 March 2026 exposed the severity of that risk environment. International rights organizations described the killing as part of a broader pattern of attacks against human rights defenders, and warned that persistent impunity continued to embolden perpetrators. The arrest of environmental activist Murtadha al-Janoubi on 4 March, following peaceful protests over water and environmental rights, reflected a parallel dynamic: the state leveraging war conditions to justify imposing more restrictions on civic action.
The absence of accountability for these acts is itself a form of harm. That no one has been held responsible for Yanar Mohammed’s killing, even after the ceasefire, reinforces the argument that the conflict did not merely generate temporary risks, but entrenched the structural impunity facing Iraqi civil society.
Restrictions extended to NGO operations as well. In a letter dated 3 March 2026, reportedly issued by the Iraqi Cabinet Secretariat, the Ministry of Finance was instructed to conduct tax audits of NGOs. Civil society organizations linked these measures to the regional escalation, viewing them as part of the broader pattern of increased pressure on accountability actors.
After the ceasefire
The ceasefire has not restored civic space. While large-scale hostilities have decreased, the structural conditions constraining civil society remain firmly in place: the continued influence of armed actors, weak accountability mechanisms and limited protection for activists. Rather than producing a meaningful reopening of civic space, the post-ceasefire period has largely seen a shift from overt conflict-related violence to more persistent, lower-visibility forms of intimidation and coercion. Many civil society organizations are operating more cautiously with less public visibility due to security and political pressures. This retreat from visible accountability work has weakened the sector’s ability to act as a public counterweight to power.
Armed groups continue to exert influence through threats and targeted attacks. On 21 April, activist Dhirgam Majid survived a second assassination attempt in Babil within two years, reportedly carried out by armed assailants on motorcycles – a recurring pattern in attacks against activists in Iraq.
Broader political and economic instability compounds these pressures. The protracted government formation process, combined with deteriorating economic conditions stemming from obstacles facing oil exports, has reduced available funding for civic initiatives. This has increased civil society’s dependence on external donors while simultaneously exposing organizations to greater regulatory scrutiny and operational constraints.
Towards restoring civic space
The US–Israel war on Iran has deepened the crisis facing Iraq’s civic space. While many political actors are incentivized to preserve weakened state institutions, reform-minded policymakers and oversight bodies should work to strengthen institutions and accountability mechanisms. In practice, this means ensuring the Independent High Commission for Human Rights has genuine investigative capacity, political independence and the ability to follow up on violations without interference. The NGO Directorate should be encouraged to move away from restrictive practices and towards enabling civil society operations.
International partners can complement these efforts through flexible, low-risk support – including protection measures, digital security and legal assistance – that reduces the exposure of organizations operating in difficult conditions. Civil society actors themselves will need to adapt, building coalitions, developing lower-visibility documentation strategies and pursuing collective advocacy approaches that will help sustain accountability work in an increasingly restrictive environment.
Ultimately, preserving civic space will remain essential not only for accountability efforts, but also for the long-term resilience and legitimacy of Iraq’s political system.
