In February 2025, Iraq’s Ministry of Environment announced the first project to be launched by the Carbon Economics Company, a collaboration with the World Food Programme to introduce mangrove forests to the shores of Basra. The company, which was established in March 2024, is meant to lead the country’s decarbonization efforts, including its recent bid to enter the international carbon credits market. Under this new scheme, presumably, polluters will be able to buy carbon credits to offset their emissions through various reforestation and conservation projects, including the mangrove initiative.
However, research suggests that carbon offsetting does not lead to any tangible reductions in emissions. It is also widely susceptible to corruption as well as a technical and market-driven solution to climate change. As such, rather than ushering in a new era of sustainability for Iraq, as described in the announcement by the Ministry of Environment, it appears that carbon credits will only align with a national policy of delaying and obstructing meaningful action on climate change. Instead, what Iraq needs is a cooperative approach that brings together key national stakeholders, supported by international expertise, to advocate unified national and international positions on climate policy.
The logics of ‘repair’
For several years, academics in southern Iraq, with the support of international organizations, have sought to introduce mangroves to the region as a means of ‘repairing’ the environmental damage from decades of armed conflict, industrial pollution and inadequate government policies. This is not only because mangroves are able to withstand saline and polluted environments, but also because they are among the most effective ecosystems for carbon sequestration. They utilize their extensive root systems to trap sediment and organic matter, locking away carbon in their biomass and the surrounding soil for extended periods. This is what makes mangroves appealing for carbon offsetting.
Critics of carbon credits, however, have long argued that they function as a greenwashing mechanism that enables ‘business as usual’ for polluting industries, while allowing them to hide behind the mantras of sustainability and corporate responsibility. This simultaneously lends legitimacy to the state and to polluting corporations, and works to pacify resistance to environmentally damaging industries. Thus, as Iraq’s government invests in planting mangroves in Basra, it is at the same time cutting down palm forests to make way for bridges and residential high rises, and draining parts of the marshlands as a mean of ‘securing’ the country’s borders. These forests and marshlands are rich ecological systems that have existed for thousands of years, and preserving them is as important as planting mangroves for the purposes of carbon capture.
It takes hundreds of years for carbon emissions to be absorbed from the atmosphere, and it is impossible to predict whether the newly planted mangroves will last that long. What is more, among some members of the scientific community in Basra, there is scepticism about whether as a non-native plant it can survive in the province’s hostile environment, as well as about the damage that such initiatives might do, including through the introduction of invasive species.
In Iraq, where politically sanctioned corruption is rife, carbon credits are easy to exploit. They rely on a calculation of the amount of emissions that would likely be released if a particular carbon-offsetting project were not in place. While Iraq has signed agreements with several international companies to oversee the carbon credits process, the number of mangroves that might be needed to absorb the emissions of any single polluter, for example, will remain vague and speculative, leaving much room for manipulation. As I have written elsewhere, reforestation projects in Basra have been criticized for their apparent links to schemes to embezzle funds through government contracts, a trend that will likely increase as the carbon credits scheme is expanded.
Carbon credits schemes provide a technical, market-oriented solution to the climate crisis. In the case of the government’s mangrove forests initiative, this hinges on the commodification of the mangroves themselves, framing them as vehicles for carbon sequestration above all else. This understanding of nature is not dissimilar from the one that made Iraq one of the strongest opponents of the phasing out of fossil fuels proposed in the draft final agreement of COP 28. It is also echoed in the Ministry of Environment’s statement announcing the collaboration with World Food Programme, which emphasised how carbon credits will work to support the development of the economy. All this attests the neoliberal logics that have made climate breakdown possible in the first place.
Towards transparent and inclusive climate policy in Iraq
In Iraq as elsewhere, a fundamental shift in policy and a radical rethinking of the emphasis on market-drive solutions is required to take meaningful action on climate change. This means that the country should adopt a cooperative approach to international climate negotiations, rather than continuing to pursue a policy of obstruction and delay, as exemplified by the turn to carbon credits. This cooperative approach would highlight the need for ongoing dialogue and joint action among a wide range of actors, including reformists within government institutions, members of civil society, academics and environmental researchers, while also drawing on international expertise.
This coalition would ensure that Iraq’s climate policies are transparent, inclusive and firmly grounded in scientific research by pressuring policymakers to prioritize genuine, long-term environmental strategies rather than stopgap solutions. Adopting this approach aims to secure Iraq’s best interests in the face of escalating climate risks at the national level and in international arenas. One of the first things the coalition could work on is to push for the implementation of stronger environmental protections, which might begin with the rapid adoption of the revised law on the protection and the improvement of the environment.
This article is part of the Reform Monitor series which provides in-depth insights into the inner-workings of Iraq’s government and evaluates what recent developments – both public and behind the scenes – reveal about the future of the Iraqi state. The Reform Monitor aims to offer policy recommendations to the Iraqi government, international policymakers, multilateral organizations, and NGOs working in Iraq to inform decision-making and programming aimed at building a more stable, accountable and prosperous Iraqi state.
The Reform Monitor series is part of the workstream on the political economy of reform, under the Middle East and North Africa Programme’s Iraq Initiative, led by project director Dr Renad Mansour.
