Article 65 of Iraq’s 2005 Constitution calls for the establishment of a second legislative chamber known as the Federation Council (FC). However, this article remains dormant, awaiting ‘to be regulated by law’ – just like many other suspended constitutional provisions. The article could offer a potential remedy for what has come to be known as Iraq’s ‘state crisis’. A draft law to establish the Federation Council was recently added to the Iraqi Council of Representatives’ (CoR) agenda for a first reading in early February 2025. This leads to questions as to whether a newly formed Federation Council can serve as a genuine tool for reform without falling into the same pitfalls that have plagued the CoR itself over the past two decades.
The idea of establishing a parallel legislative institution prompts a reassessment of the CoR’s performance – especially given the recent passing of several controversial laws during its current term, including the personal status law, the general amnesty law, and the state properties law – all passed in a single package vote. The repercussions of these laws extend even into the judiciary, sparking a dispute between the Supreme Judicial Council and the Federal Supreme Court. The latter issued a temporary injunction suspending their enforcement, only for the Supreme Judicial Council to challenge the injunction’s constitutionality, arguing that the laws had not yet been published in the Official Gazette. Ultimately, the Federal Supreme Court revoked its own order allowing the laws to pass.
This episode reveals deep structural flaws in Iraq’s political system, characterized by the sectarian power-sharing (muhasasa) and political deal-making. This ‘state crisis’ is fueled by the politicization of the CoR and state institutions, which often serve either patronage networks or populist agendas, rather than serving the nation’s critical needs. The enacting of the three controversial laws highlight the state’s vulnerability to sectarian alignments: Shiite parties opposed the amnesty law labeling it a ‘Sunni law’ while the Shiite-influenced personal status law drew heavy criticism from civil society and international organizations which saw it as legitimizing child marriage. Meanwhile, the land return law sparked Arab-Kurdish tensions, especially with rightful owners of land in Kirkuk.
The Federation Council and prospects for reform
Speaker of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani has repeatedly emphasized the importance of establishing the Federation Council, naming it a top priority for the current legislative term and urging at least a first reading of the draft law. In theory, the FC could function as a strong oversight body, capable of reviewing and challenging legislation passed by the CoR. It is also designed to provide equitable representation for Iraq’s provinces: the draft law proposes two representatives for each province, in addition to four for the capital, Baghdad. This institutional design allows for regional representation that complements the popular representation of the lower house. Unsurprisingly, this prospect unsettles political elites, as it could disrupt existing power arrangements, especially given that the FC would represent sovereign decision-making rather than populist agendas or patronage networks.
Moreover, the Federation Council could help restore institutional balance by supporting the Presidency of Iraq, whose constitutional role in the legislative process has often been undermined. Article 73(3) of the Constitution grants the President the authority to ratify laws enacted by the Council of Representatives before they come into force. In practice, however, some laws are enacted immediately upon parliamentary approval, accompanied by annotations such as ‘‘this law shall take effect upon issuance by the Council of Representatives’ – thereby bypassing the presidency altogether. Improved inter-institutional coordination, enabled by the Federation Council assuming its intended role, could help reinforce political stability.
Additionally, the FC would be tasked with overseeing the implementation of Articles 105 and 106 of the Constitution, which are designed to safeguard provincial rights. Article 105 calls for the establishment of a public commission to ensure fair participation of regions and governorates in federal institutions, while Article 106 mandates the creation of a commission to oversee the allocation of federal revenues. If effectively enforced, these provisions would grant the FC meaningful authority not only over the legislative branch, but also over the executive. This would help limit political deal-making that violates the Constitution or marginalizes specific communities, while also serving as a deterrent for financial and administrative corruption.
Guarantees and challenges
The critical question remains: what guarantees exist to prevent the FC from replicating the failures of other state institutions? What value is there in adding yet another dysfunctional component to an already unstable legislative framework?
Unfortunately, no firm guarantees are in place. The core problem lies in the persistent lack of constitutional adherence and political will among Iraq’s ruling elites to protect the state and strengthen its institutions. As such, the responsibility falls on the Iraqi public and intellectual elite to safeguard the integrity of the FC that would in turn make Iraq’s political system more accountable. Achieving this would require convening a national conference that brings together the political elite, civil society actors, local leaders and academics to explore reform mechanisms and produce a new social that reaffirms collective commitment to the rule of law, national sovereignty, and political accountability.
However, given the many past reform failures, current regional instability and the challenges facing Iraq’s political system, there is a risk that the FC itself could become yet another instrument in the hands of the political elite. In this context, adopting the model of ‘open legislative councils’ within the FCFC could enhance transparency and public oversight over its operations to strengthen its institutional resilience and make the FC more resistant to corruption.
A possible force for reform
If established with a clear vision, the FC could restore balance to Iraq’s political system. Its role in reviewing legislations and monitoring the CoR could restrain the passage of laws driven by narrow partisan agendas. However, this would only be effective if the FC is endowed with substantial authority, including the power to review and veto the federal budget law, and to vote on or object to the appointment of senior officials in both the executive and judicial branches.
The establishment of the FC is not merely a superficial structural adjustment. It could be a gateway to deepen reform, provided that political and civil actors play a meaningful role in defining its mandate. Through the aforementioned national conference, the FC can be shaped into a credible force for reform rather than a new insubstantial institution dominated by the same sectarian dynamics and political wrangling. International support will also be critical, whether in pressuring political parties to implement reforms or by supporting the establishment of robust mechanisms for accountability and transparency.
Ultimately, the success of the Federation Council hinges on the presence of genuine political will for reform. It could become a turning point in Iraq’s political landscape, or, if established with the same mindset that has governed the CoR for the past two decades, merely another layer of dysfunction in an already complicated system, offering no real solution to Iraq’s state crisis.
This article is part of the Reform Monitor series which provides in-depth insights into the inner-workings of Iraq’s government and evaluates what recent developments – both public and behind the scenes – reveal about the future of the Iraqi state. The Reform Monitor aims to offer policy recommendations to the Iraqi government, international policymakers, multilateral organizations, and NGOs working in Iraq to inform decision-making and programming aimed at building a more stable, accountable and prosperous Iraqi state.
The Reform Monitor series is part of the workstream on the political economy of reform, under the Middle East and North Africa Programme’s Iraq Initiative, led by project director Dr Renad Mansour.
