The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 was met with widespread relief – not only among Syrians but among regional actors eager to move past its destabilizing, criminal enterprises. Hopes were highest that Syria’s trade in Captagon – the highly addictive drug that, under Assad, flooded regional markets via Jordan – would come to an end.
While the regime’s collapse has disrupted the drug trade, narcotics trafficking persists. This is a reflection of the ability of Syria’s smugglers to adapt, taking advantage of the country’s porous borders, entrenched supply chains, sustained regional demand, and the trade’s enduring profitability in a fractured economy. Without a comprehensive strategy to tackle these underlying drivers, drug smuggling will likely remain entrenched in Syria’s post-Assad landscape.
A state-built drug empire
Since 2019, officials believe that Assad regime played a central role in the Captagon trade, turning Syria into a major hub for drug production and smuggling. This illicit enterprise was highly organized, involving state institutions, military resources, and illicit networks. ‘It’s reported that h-ranking officials and military officers oversaw Captagon production and trafficking, often working with Lebanon’s Hezbollah and organized crime groups to expand distribution networks. According to the Syrian organization Etana, in June 2023, 79 per cent of Suwayda’s drug network and 63 per cent of Daraa’s were linked to Syrian military intelligence. Factories were strategically located in regime-controlled areas – particularly in rural Damascus, Homs, and Latakia – where they operated with security and efficiency.
What began as a small-scale operation evolved into a multibillion-dollar industry, sustaining patronage networks, generating illicit revenue, and pressuring neighbouring states by flooding their territories with drugs. With most trafficking routes running through Daraa into Jordan, the province became a critical gateway for Syria’s expanding role in the regional drug trade, fuelling state tensions with its neighbours.
Smuggling operations in a post-Assad Syria
Despite the collapse of Assad’s regime, Syria’s drug trafficking networks remain active. According to Etana, at least 25 cross-border smuggling attempts into Jordan were recorded between Assad’s departure on 8 December and mid-January, with 14 occurring since the start of 2025. Though significantly lower than the 65 attempts recorded by the same organization during the same period in 2023–24, the continued smuggling underscores the resilience of these networks.
This resilience is unsurprising given the ability of the drug traffickers to adapt quickly. Despite losing state protection, Syria’s smugglers have swiftly exploited the power vacuum left by the regime’s fall. Taking advantage of weak security control, they have relocated drug-related assets to safeguard Captagon production equipment, and stockpiled supplies. Reports indicate that traffickers also looted narcotic materials and machinery from regime sites, particularly those linked to military intelligence and the 4th Division in southern Syria and rural Damascus.
In addition to securing production infrastructure, trafficking networks have maintained access to significant stockpiles of narcotics accumulated before the regime’s collapse. These reserves allow smugglers to sustain operations despite political upheaval. Moreover, it’s claimed that continue to source additional narcotics – especially hashish and crystal meth – from Lebanon and Iraq to compensate for any supply disruptions.
Beyond preserving their supply chains, Syria’s smugglers have also enhanced their operational capacity. News reports showed that pro-regime forces hastily fled southern Syria, this enabled traffickers looted abandoned military bases and weapons depots, securing firearms and military-grade equipment. This has strengthened their ability to provide armed cover for cross-border smuggling operations, making counter-trafficking efforts riskier and more difficult.
Diverse smuggling tactics
Smugglers have continued to diversify their methods, using a range of tactics to evade detection. Recent trafficking attempts include moving drugs on foot through remote illegal crossings, particularly when weather conditions allow. Smugglers are also increasingly using drones, which are widely available in southern Syria – even in mobile phone shops – where they sell for between $4,000 and $8,000. Their accessibility has made it easier for traffickers to transport small quantities of high-value, low-weight drugs such as crystal meth.
This combination of tactics has reportedly enabled smugglers to maintain a success rate similar to pre-collapse levels. According to Etana, eight of the total smuggling attempts so far have been successful, reflecting a 32 per cent success rate. The profitability of these operations, combined with Syria’s fragile economy, will continue to drive the drug trade as a key source of income. Weakened by years of conflict, heavy international sanctions, and limited economic opportunities, the country’s recovery is likely to remain slow and difficult, even in a post-Assad era. With few legitimate job prospects, many young men could be drawn to the illicit economy as a lucrative and appealing livelihood, further entrenching Syria’s role in regional narcotics networks.
Limited enforcement capacity
The limited capacity of the new Syrian authorities has further enabled traffickers to exploit security vulnerabilities. HTS’s rapid takeover of vast territories following the regime’s collapse has severely strained its resources, weakening its ability to maintain a centralized command structure for border security. As a result, many former regime posts along the Syrian–Jordanian border are now manned by local factions that lack the necessary resources and coordination for systematic monitoring. This has, in turn, provided smugglers with greater operational freedom, particularly in remote areas.
Similarly, the new authorities’ limited capacity has hampered efforts to implement systematic counter-narcotics operations. While they have uncovered industrial-scale narcotics production and packaging facilities in various locations, including in rural Damascus, these detection efforts remain inconsistent – especially in curbing smuggling into Jordan. Without a coordinated and sustained domestic approach, traffickers will continue to exploit gaps in enforcement, ensuring the resilience of the illicit drug trade.
The evidence strongly suggests that while Assad’s fall has disrupted Syria’s drug trade, it has not eradicated the country’s role in regional narcotics trafficking. Addressing this issue requires sustained international cooperation, enhanced border security measures, and targeted economic development programmes to provide viable alternatives to smuggling.
Efforts must also focus on reducing regional demand for narcotics, as continued profitability remains a core driver of the trade. Without a comprehensive and coordinated strategy, Syria’s post-Assad landscape will remain vulnerable to the influence of illicit drug networks, perpetuating instability both within the country and beyond its borders.
This article was produced with support from the Cross-Border Conflict Evidence, Policy and Trends (XCEPT) research programme, funded by UK International Development. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.
