By virtue of geography and demography, Kurdish populations will always play a role in relations between Turkey and Iran. Both countries are accused of marginalizing and oppressing their own Kurdish communities, and oppose Kurdish self-determination at home and around the region. Yet, they also tactically support Kurdish groups in the neighbouring countries of Iraq and Syria while seeking a strategic advantage in regional geopolitics.
Kurdish affairs are thus a sensitive point of contact between Ankara and Tehran – one that requires careful management from each side in order to balance competition for influence with the need to avoid creating friction with the other.
Kurdish groups are not passive players and seek advantages of their own through pragmatic dealings with Ankara, Tehran and other governments. Sometimes, this is part of competition between Kurdish groups; at other times, it is a way to buttress their interests against hostile state forces. These dynamics intensify during periods of instability, like what the region is now experiencing due to Iran’s weakened regional influence and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024. Turkey and Iran risk escalating bilateral tensions if they become too deeply involved in intra-Kurdish politics, particularly if other actors like the West are not as present to deflect away from what would otherwise become a zero-sum competition.
Turkey and Iran’s Kurdish backyard: oppression, dissent, and de-escalation
Kurdish communities in Turkey and Iran make up a significant portion of the 40-million Kurds in the Middle East, as well as sizeable minorities in both countries. About 20 per cent of Turkey’s population is Kurdish, and 15 per cent of Iran’s. Both states severely restrict the political and cultural rights of their Kurdish communities, which has led to armed uprisings against the state. In Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has long fought an insurgency against Ankara; in Iran, Kurdish opposition is fragmented across groups, including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) and the Komala Party. Both Turkey and Iran warn that Kurdish militancy could threaten the territorial integrity of the state and insist that harsh security measures are necessary to prevent separatism.
Ankara and Tehran generally avoid supporting Kurdish armed groups within the others’ borders. Iran’s periodic tolerance of the PKK is likely intended to distract Turkey and serve as a bargaining chip in discussions. For example, the PJAK – which has close ties to the PKK – escaped Tehran’s domestic crackdown on Kurdish groups following the 2022 protests sparked by the death of Jina Masha Amini.
In Turkey, recent developments suggest Turkish–Kurdish relations are entering a new phase. Domestic considerations, including President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s efforts to secure the support of Kurdish voters for a fourth term in office, as well as the heightened risk of regional instability and conflict, prompted Ankara to make overtures to imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. In February 2025, Ocalan called on the PKK to disarm and dissolve and the group followed up on May 12 by announcing its disbandment. If this shift by the PKK away from armed struggle is implemented, it would lower tensions in south-eastern Turkey and allow Ankara to focus attention on regional priorities, including competition with Iran. However, the Turkish state must also now respond in substantive ways to Kurdish political and cultural demands.
A well-established game of influence in Iraqi Kurdistan
Turkey and Iran more actively compete for influence in the Kurdish areas of Iraq, where they maintain political, security, and economic ties with the two main Iraqi Kurdish parties – the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). However, both opposed the 2017 independence referendum in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, and they prioritize their relationships with Baghdad over those with Kurdish groups.
The KDP and the PUK technically share power within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), but their relationship is increasingly tense and dysfunctional. The two parties will likely form a power-sharing cabinet in the coming months based on a negotiated government programme – but past agreements have unravelled over time. This uncertainty creates space for regional powers to intervene in Iraqi Kurdish politics.
The common view held among foreign officials and analysts is that the KDP is allied with Turkey and opposed to Iran’s regional influence, and the PUK is closer to Iran and tolerates the presence of the PKK. While there is ample evidence to support this, the reality is more complex. Despite hostile rhetoric, both parties are pragmatic and maintain working relationships with multiple sides, making adjustments as circumstances change.
Take the January 2024 Iranian missile attack on targets in Erbil, which killed four civilians, including a prominent KDP-affiliated businessman. Tehran claimed was a strike on a clandestine Israeli base, though this was denied by Kurdish and Iraqi authorities. The incident sparked international outrage and prompted Erbil to ask the US for air defences; however, the KDP’s relations with Tehran improved over the course of the year, and included mutual visits by high-ranking officials. The anniversary of the January attack passed without comment from the KRG or media outlets, which are highly attuned to the wishes of KDP and PUK politicians.
The KDP’s reconciliation with Iran is unlikely to concern Turkey, which is confident in its own strong relations with the KDP. The PUK–Turkey relationship is strained at present, though they remain in contact and resolving the current closure of Turkish airspace to flights to and from Sulaymaniyah airport remains a live topic of discussion. These shifting dynamics underscore the limits of simplistic relationship mapping to analyze regional geopolitics in the Kurdistan Region, particularly with reference to Turkey and Iran.
New competition – and risk of spillover – in Northeast Syria
Given the rapid pace of change in Syria, Syrian Kurdistan is one of the most interesting places to observe Turkey–Iran relations. Turkey is clearly ascendant in the country as a whole – a shift that has occurred largely at Iran’s expense. Both states retain relatively antagonistic relations with the Kurdish-led authorities in the northeast.
Turkey, in particular, has been unrelentingly hostile. It opposes another autonomous Kurdish zone on its southern border and views the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as part of the PKK. It has launched three separate military operations against the PKK since 2016 and also regularly conducts airstrikes against critical infrastructure and civilian targets in northeast Syria. At present, Ankara is backing intra-Kurdish reconciliation efforts and appears supportive of negotiations between the Kurdish authorities and the new government in Damascus. However, Turkey’s list of acceptable outcomes is very narrow. If Kurdish demands for federalism and decentralization grow too bold in Ankara’s view, or if talks fail to meet its approval, a new military operation is possible. This would undermine Kurdish leverage over Damascus by eroding their territorial control. Meanwhile, the US under President Donald Trump is drawing down troops from Syria. With Trump facing far fewer institutional constraints than during his first term, a full withdrawal of US forces is plausible. This would leave the SDF largely on its own.
In contrast, Iran has kept its engagement with Syrian Kurds at arm’s length since 2011, channelling it largely through the Assad regime or tribal interests in Deir ez-Zor. However, since the loss of its primary ally in Syria, there is speculation that Iran will seek a pragmatic relationship with the Kurdish authorities in the northeast in order to maintain access to the Levant and as a counter to pro-Turkish interests in Syria. While there is little concrete evidence of this shift, Ankara appears intent on preventing such a relationship from emerging. Turkish media have already floated allegations that Iran is supplying drones to the SDF – claims that have been strongly denied.
Ankara and Tehran have so far managed relations with the Kurds in their own territories and in Iraq by attending to their own interests and avoiding overt competition. Syria could disrupt this dynamic given the degree of upheaval and instability in the country at present – though it is too early to tell.
Western retreat and regional opportunity
Turkey and Iran have long shared the stage with the US and European governments in influencing Kurdish affairs. While Western support was often inconsistent, it provided the Kurds with a degree of political support and geopolitical recognition that Ankara and Tehran denied them. This support was key to the emergence of semi-autonomous institutions in Iraq and Syria.
That dynamic appears to be changing. The attention of Western governments is increasingly elsewhere, which gives regional powers like Turkey and Iran greater freedom of action. This is particularly true of Kurdish issues, which are often miscast as domestic matters for the sovereign states where Kurds live. Amid the low ebb of Western attention, pragmatic Kurdish leaders will likely refocus their political energies on finding ways to work with Turkey and Iran. Meanwhile, other states like China appear to be stepping up their game in parts of Kurdistan by increasing its soft power influence.
That said, the West still has a role to play. Washington’s recent effort to broker an agreement between the KDP and the SDF shows it continues to be a critically useful facilitator. Rather than seek to be an all-encompassing player, Western powers can use their still-significant influence and capacities in targeted ways designed to maximize impact – such as supporting intra-Kurdish unity agreements in Iraq and Syria and overseeing their implementation. European governments, in particular, could step up humanitarian and economic development funding in Kurdish areas, particularly since the US is stepping back from its commitments under the new Trump administration.
Addressing the material needs of ordinary Kurds at home will not only reduce migration, which is a key policy goal in Europe, but assure them that they have not been forgotten. A positive Western presence at this point remains crucial – especially in contrast to the more hostile approaches of Turkey and Iran to most Kurdish ambitions.
This article is part of a policy series for the ‘Evolving Turkey–Iran relations and implications for regional reordering’ project of the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) network.
The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of the CATS Network, an international network of think-tanks and research institutions working on Turkey.
