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	<title>Iran &#8211; Kalam</title>
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	<title>Iran &#8211; Kalam</title>
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	<item>
		<title>Iran’s calculus: Negotiations through deterrence and leverage</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/irans-calculus-negotiations-through-deterrence-and-leverage/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/irans-calculus-negotiations-through-deterrence-and-leverage/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Faezeh Foroutan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 15:49:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5632</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In a Fox News interview on 6 August 2026, US Vice President JD Vance said Iran’s leadership is divided between those favouring negotiations and those ‘crazy radicals’ wanting the war to continue. His description reflects a broader misunderstanding in Washington, which tends to view Iranian decision-making as a simple choice between diplomacy and confrontation. However, [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/irans-calculus-negotiations-through-deterrence-and-leverage/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>From parallel ambitions to colliding spheres: Iran–Turkey rivalry in a connected region</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/from-parallel-ambitions-to-colliding-spheres-iran-turkey-rivalry-in-a-connected-region/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/from-parallel-ambitions-to-colliding-spheres-iran-turkey-rivalry-in-a-connected-region/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hamidreza Azizi]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 07 Jul 2025 10:18:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5021</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This article was written prior to the 12 June 2025 escalation between Iran and Israel. The collapse of Syria’s Assad regime in late 2024 marked a turning point in Iranian–Turkish competition. It not only undercut Iran’s axis of resistance but also gave Turkey a decisive advantage in Syria and reinforced its hand in the South [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/from-parallel-ambitions-to-colliding-spheres-iran-turkey-rivalry-in-a-connected-region/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>A careful balancing act: Turkey-Iran competition in regional Kurdish geopolitics</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/a-careful-balancing-act-turkey-iran-competition-in-regional-kurdish-geopolitics/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/a-careful-balancing-act-turkey-iran-competition-in-regional-kurdish-geopolitics/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Winthrop Rodgers]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 May 2025 09:26:24 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Regional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=4862</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[By virtue of geography and demography, Kurdish populations will always play a role in relations between Turkey and Iran. Both countries are accused of marginalizing and oppressing their own Kurdish communities, and oppose Kurdish self-determination at home and around the region. Yet, they also tactically support Kurdish groups in the neighbouring countries of Iraq and [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/a-careful-balancing-act-turkey-iran-competition-in-regional-kurdish-geopolitics/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Competing visions: Turkey, Iran and the struggle to shape the regional order</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/competing-visions-turkey-iran-and-the-struggle-to-shape-the-regional-order/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/competing-visions-turkey-iran-and-the-struggle-to-shape-the-regional-order/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sanam Vakil]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Apr 2025 11:37:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Regional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & regional security]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=4831</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In an increasingly uncertain geopolitical landscape and amid intensifying competition between key powers, countries in the region are adjusting their foreign policy approaches in response to shifting power dynamics. These shifts are driven by several factors, including US–China tensions, global fragmentation, ongoing regional rivalries and pronounced instability. In the absence of a comprehensive regional security [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/competing-visions-turkey-iran-and-the-struggle-to-shape-the-regional-order/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Iraq’s water shortage crisis: a transnational conflict systems perspective</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/iraqs-water-shortage-crisis-a-transnational-conflict-systems-perspective/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/iraqs-water-shortage-crisis-a-transnational-conflict-systems-perspective/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Zmkan Ali Saleem]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 21 Feb 2025 11:17:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Climate change]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=4661</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Iraq is grappling with an escalating water conflict, intensified by severe drought, rising domestic consumption, and the damming policies of neighbouring Turkey and Iran. While researchers have highlighted the transnational nature of Iraq&#8217;s water shortage, particularly the direct roles of Turkey and Iran in reducing water flow into Iraq, it is imperative to also consider [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/iraqs-water-shortage-crisis-a-transnational-conflict-systems-perspective/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Iran’s generational leadership change</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/irans-generational-leadership-change/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/irans-generational-leadership-change/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mehrzad Boroujerdi]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 May 2023 15:12:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=1968</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Many of the recent discussions about Iran’s generational leadership changes have been speculative, anecdotal and centred on particular personalities. This paper attempts to broaden that analysis, and is based on a decades-long study of more than 2,500 members of the Iranian political elite.1 Rooted in empirical data, the paper provides an analysis of the existing [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/irans-generational-leadership-change/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Mahsa Jina Amini case: security and ethnic dimensions</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/the-mahsa-jina-amini-case-security-and-ethnic-dimensions/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/the-mahsa-jina-amini-case-security-and-ethnic-dimensions/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Walter Posch]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 05 May 2023 15:11:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=1964</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Iranian motives The suspicious death of the young student Mahsa Jina Amini in Iranian police custody on 16 September 2022 triggered a series of protests in Iran that are ongoing. That said, the display of public discontent was much smaller than the 2009 protests, and some cities in Iran have had no protests at all. [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/the-mahsa-jina-amini-case-security-and-ethnic-dimensions/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Iran’s regional policy: the view from Israel and the region</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/irans-regional-policy-the-view-from-israel-and-the-region/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/irans-regional-policy-the-view-from-israel-and-the-region/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sima Shine]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Apr 2023 15:08:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=1959</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Regional Perspectives on Iran  Regional states have generally viewed Iran – both in recent times and over the past two decades – as a strong and powerful military force. This is despite the sanctions it is under, the harsh economic conditions prevalent in the country and the recent internal upheaval sparked by the death of [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/irans-regional-policy-the-view-from-israel-and-the-region/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Iranian military developments and trends</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/iranian-military-developments-and-trends/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/iranian-military-developments-and-trends/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Eisenstadt]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Apr 2023 15:06:48 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=1953</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The Islamic Republic of Iran has three core components to its national security policy: its grey zone regional strategy; its unconventional force structure; and its nuclear hedging strategy. In the coming years, each of these will be influenced by: (i) lessons learned from more than four decades of experience, which have largely validated its national [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/iranian-military-developments-and-trends/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Putin’s war in Ukraine and prospects for Russian-Iranian relations</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/putins-war-in-ukraine-and-prospects-for-russian-iranian-relations/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/putins-war-in-ukraine-and-prospects-for-russian-iranian-relations/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nikolay Kozhanov]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Apr 2023 15:02:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[External actors]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=1948</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has become the catalyst for a qualitative change of tone in the Russian-Iranian dialogue, bringing the two states closer together. Yet, this step-change in Russian-Iranian relations was not solely prompted by the war in Ukraine. Various factors prepared the ground for this, not all of them Ukraine-related. They include Russia’s unprecedentedly [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/putins-war-in-ukraine-and-prospects-for-russian-iranian-relations/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
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