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	<title>Geopolitics &amp; security &#8211; Kalam</title>
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	<title>Geopolitics &amp; security &#8211; Kalam</title>
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	<item>
		<title>Is the Ceuta crisis a Moroccan problem, or a European one?</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/is-the-ceuta-crisis-a-moroccan-problem-or-a-european-one/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/is-the-ceuta-crisis-a-moroccan-problem-or-a-european-one/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Osama El-Mourabit]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 12:22:38 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[North Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Morocco]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5694</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The mass crossing of young migrants from Morocco into Ceuta in July 2026 serves as a reminder of the need to rethink the European migration model. Many European governments continue to view Morocco and other countries of the Global South as contractors that, under specific arrangements, guard the continent from irregular migration – an approach [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/is-the-ceuta-crisis-a-moroccan-problem-or-a-european-one/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Iran’s calculus: Negotiations through deterrence and leverage</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/irans-calculus-negotiations-through-deterrence-and-leverage/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/irans-calculus-negotiations-through-deterrence-and-leverage/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Faezeh Foroutan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 15:49:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5632</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In a Fox News interview on 6 August 2026, US Vice President JD Vance said Iran’s leadership is divided between those favouring negotiations and those ‘crazy radicals’ wanting the war to continue. His description reflects a broader misunderstanding in Washington, which tends to view Iranian decision-making as a simple choice between diplomacy and confrontation. However, [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/irans-calculus-negotiations-through-deterrence-and-leverage/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Realignment in the Maghreb: How Algeria is shaping Tunisia’s political trajectory</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/realignment-in-the-maghreb-how-algeria-is-shaping-tunisias-political-trajectory/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/realignment-in-the-maghreb-how-algeria-is-shaping-tunisias-political-trajectory/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Safae El Yaaqoubi]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2025 12:17:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[North Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Algeria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tunisia]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5226</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[When Tunisia’s political crisis began in 2021, it was widely viewed as a domestic breakdown, driven by institutional gridlock, economic pressure, and President Kais Saied’s consolidation of power. But as Tunisia grew more isolated, external actors, most notably Algeria, began exerting greater influence over its trajectory. Algeria has since taken a more assertive role, offering [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/realignment-in-the-maghreb-how-algeria-is-shaping-tunisias-political-trajectory/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>How Russia, Turkey and Iran are reshaping the Caucasus</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-russia-turkey-and-iran-are-reshaping-the-caucasus/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-russia-turkey-and-iran-are-reshaping-the-caucasus/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Natalie Sabanadze]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2025 10:40:24 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Regional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[External actors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5037</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In recent years, the South Caucasus has become a microcosm of multipolarity, with Russia, Turkey and Iran competing for influence and navigating a fragile mix of cooperation and rivalry. The post-Cold War regional order – dominated by Russia and defined by its standoff with the West – was structured around two main axes: the Russia–Armenia–Iran [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-russia-turkey-and-iran-are-reshaping-the-caucasus/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>From parallel ambitions to colliding spheres: Iran–Turkey rivalry in a connected region</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/from-parallel-ambitions-to-colliding-spheres-iran-turkey-rivalry-in-a-connected-region/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/from-parallel-ambitions-to-colliding-spheres-iran-turkey-rivalry-in-a-connected-region/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hamidreza Azizi]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 07 Jul 2025 10:18:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5021</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This article was written prior to the 12 June 2025 escalation between Iran and Israel. The collapse of Syria’s Assad regime in late 2024 marked a turning point in Iranian–Turkish competition. It not only undercut Iran’s axis of resistance but also gave Turkey a decisive advantage in Syria and reinforced its hand in the South [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/from-parallel-ambitions-to-colliding-spheres-iran-turkey-rivalry-in-a-connected-region/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Rivals within: How Iran and Turkey compete inside Iraq’s fractured politics</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/rivals-within-how-iran-and-turkey-compete-inside-iraqs-fractured-politics/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/rivals-within-how-iran-and-turkey-compete-inside-iraqs-fractured-politics/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kamaran Palani]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Jun 2025 13:31:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5002</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This article was written prior to the 12 June 2025 escalation between Iran and Israel. Since 2003, Iraq has emerged as a battleground for Iranian and Turkish influence. These regional powers avoid direct confrontation, instead pursuing strategic rivalry channelled through local actors, while selectively cooperating on shared interests such as opposing Kurdish independence. While major [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/rivals-within-how-iran-and-turkey-compete-inside-iraqs-fractured-politics/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>A careful balancing act: Turkey-Iran competition in regional Kurdish geopolitics</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/a-careful-balancing-act-turkey-iran-competition-in-regional-kurdish-geopolitics/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/a-careful-balancing-act-turkey-iran-competition-in-regional-kurdish-geopolitics/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Winthrop Rodgers]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 May 2025 09:26:24 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Regional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=4862</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[By virtue of geography and demography, Kurdish populations will always play a role in relations between Turkey and Iran. Both countries are accused of marginalizing and oppressing their own Kurdish communities, and oppose Kurdish self-determination at home and around the region. Yet, they also tactically support Kurdish groups in the neighbouring countries of Iraq and [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/a-careful-balancing-act-turkey-iran-competition-in-regional-kurdish-geopolitics/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Assad’s fall ends drug smuggling – but trafficking to Jordan persists</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/assads-fall-ends-drug-smuggling-but-trafficking-to-jordan-persists/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/assads-fall-ends-drug-smuggling-but-trafficking-to-jordan-persists/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Haid Haid]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Mar 2025 10:16:45 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jordan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=4769</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 was met with widespread relief – not only among Syrians but among regional actors eager to move past its destabilizing, criminal enterprises. Hopes were highest that Syria’s trade in Captagon – the highly addictive drug that, under Assad, flooded regional markets via Jordan – would come [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/assads-fall-ends-drug-smuggling-but-trafficking-to-jordan-persists/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Hezbollah’s smuggling lifeline: can Syria’s new authorities cut it off?</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/hezbollahs-smuggling-lifeline-can-syrias-new-authorities-cut-it-off/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/hezbollahs-smuggling-lifeline-can-syrias-new-authorities-cut-it-off/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Haid Haid]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Mar 2025 12:40:06 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=4761</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Since the ouster of the Assad regime in December 2024, the transitional authorities in Damascus have repeatedly vowed to sever Hezbollah’s reliance on Syria as a key smuggling corridor. For over a decade, it is reported that the group has freely moved drugs, money, and weapons through Syrian territory to finance and arm itself. In [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/hezbollahs-smuggling-lifeline-can-syrias-new-authorities-cut-it-off/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>How Haftar’s focus on southern Libya relates to a growing regional strategy</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-haftars-focus-on-southern-libya-relates-to-a-growing-regional-strategy/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-haftars-focus-on-southern-libya-relates-to-a-growing-regional-strategy/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ahmed Ahmed]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Mar 2025 11:51:39 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[North Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Libya]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=4755</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Libya’s vast southwestern Fezzan region is vital to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar as he strives for financial independence and international recognition. Having become the unequalled military authority in the region, Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) are steadily encroaching on government prerogatives to capture local markets and revenue flows. Critical to these efforts are the [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-haftars-focus-on-southern-libya-relates-to-a-growing-regional-strategy/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
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