<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Kalam</title>
	<atom:link href="https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org</link>
	<description>Chatham House</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 14:26:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.8.3</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>Beyond informality: A formal roadmap for Syrian refugees in Lebanon</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/beyond-informality-a-formal-roadmap-for-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/beyond-informality-a-formal-roadmap-for-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Carmen Geha]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 14:26:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5481</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The Middle East hosts the highest per capita number of refugees and displaced persons in the world, and nowhere is this more acutely felt than in Lebanon. But Lebanon’s refugee protection frameworks are under growing pressure: international donor support has shrunk amid its economic crisis, UN agencies face mounting funding risks, and human rights are [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/beyond-informality-a-formal-roadmap-for-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Open waste burning and the limits of local governance in Iraq</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/open-waste-burning-and-the-limits-of-local-governance-in-iraq/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/open-waste-burning-and-the-limits-of-local-governance-in-iraq/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Othman Kareem]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Mar 2026 13:56:55 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5437</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Open waste burning in Iraq is a failure of governance rather than of compliance. Although explicitly prohibited under Iraq’s Environmental Protection and Improvement Law No. 27 of 2009, the practice has become a routine feature of urban life, particularly in peripheral districts, informal settlements and overstretched dumpsites. Its persistence exposes structural weaknesses in how authority, financing and enforcement are organised across Iraq’s waste [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/open-waste-burning-and-the-limits-of-local-governance-in-iraq/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Ending the destructive ambiguity of the Western Sahara peace process</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/ending-the-destructive-ambiguity-of-the-western-sahara-peace-process/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/ending-the-destructive-ambiguity-of-the-western-sahara-peace-process/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jacob Mundy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Mar 2026 16:34:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[North Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Morocco]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5404</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Seemingly out of nowhere, high-level negotiations between Morocco and the Western Saharan independence movement have resumed after a hiatus of nearly seven years. Equally surprising is the pace of these encounters: three so far since late January 2026 – two in Washington, DC, and one in Madrid. For two decades, UN mediators had been fortunate [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/ending-the-destructive-ambiguity-of-the-western-sahara-peace-process/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>How Europe and the GCC can respond to growing armed group cooperation</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/how-europe-and-the-gcc-can-respond-to-growing-armed-group-cooperation/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/how-europe-and-the-gcc-can-respond-to-growing-armed-group-cooperation/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eleonora Ardemagni]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 26 Feb 2026 16:38:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Regional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conflict & violence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[External actors]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5365</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Across the broader Mediterranean, particularly along the Red Sea and the North Africa–Horn corridors, armed groups are increasingly cooperating across borders. These linkages, fuelled primarily by smuggling networks, allow groups to transfer arms, military equipment and know-how. This has resulted in more capable and more resilient networks operating across land and maritime corridors that are [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/how-europe-and-the-gcc-can-respond-to-growing-armed-group-cooperation/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Sweida: A lens on Syria’s illiberal peace</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/sweida-a-lens-on-syrias-illiberal-peace/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/sweida-a-lens-on-syrias-illiberal-peace/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rana Khalaf]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2026 17:01:33 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5350</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The evolving map of territorial control of Al-Sharaa’s interim authority (government and aligned groups), from its takeover of large swathes of Syria’s northeast to its agreed demilitarised economic zone with Israel in the south, could be argued as delivering short-term stabilisation. In the long term, stabilisation remains subject to a broader reality: Al-Sharaa’s interim government [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/sweida-a-lens-on-syrias-illiberal-peace/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Containment and adaptation: governance in the Arab World after 2011</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/containment-and-adaptation-governance-in-the-arab-world-after-2011/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/containment-and-adaptation-governance-in-the-arab-world-after-2011/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sanam Vakil]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2026 10:31:07 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Regional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5311</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The post-Arab Spring period has been less about transformation than containment. More than a decade after protests spread across the Arab world, most political systems neither collapsed nor democratized. Instead, they adapted, reshaping governance in ways that absorbed popular pressure while preserving existing power structures. When protests swept the region in 2011, they were driven [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/containment-and-adaptation-governance-in-the-arab-world-after-2011/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Anti-harassment reform: creating safer workplaces in Saudi Arabia</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/anti-harassment-reform-creating-safer-workplaces-in-saudi-arabia/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/anti-harassment-reform-creating-safer-workplaces-in-saudi-arabia/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Beata Polok]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 06 Jan 2026 15:39:22 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Gulf]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gender]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5296</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The Anti-Harassment Law of 2018 is an important step forward in creating safer workplaces for women in Saudi Arabia, and is a key component of efforts to support their growing participation in the labour market under the Vision 2030 reform agenda. By criminalizing harassment, setting clear penalties, establishing employer obligations and complaint mechanisms, the law [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/anti-harassment-reform-creating-safer-workplaces-in-saudi-arabia/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Will clerics lead Iraq’s next protest movement?</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/will-clerics-lead-iraqs-next-protest-movement/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/will-clerics-lead-iraqs-next-protest-movement/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Benedict Robin-D'Cruz]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Nov 2025 11:50:29 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5257</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The results of Iraq’s 2025 national elections have crystallised several long-term trends. The withering of ideological politics has accelerated, while employment patronage has consolidated as the main vehicle for political mobilisation. However, for those excluded from the benefits of this state largesse, trust in political leadership continues to wane. Turnout was notably lowest amongst Iraq’s Shia majority in Baghdad and the southern provinces, while over 700,000 ballots were spoiled. [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/will-clerics-lead-iraqs-next-protest-movement/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Navigating digital labour transitions in MENA: Lessons from Qatar and Lebanon</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/navigating-digital-labour-transitions-in-mena-lessons-from-qatar-and-lebanon/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/navigating-digital-labour-transitions-in-mena-lessons-from-qatar-and-lebanon/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sara Cherqaoui]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2025 10:31:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gulf]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Political economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Qatar]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5234</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Digital transformation is reshaping labour markets across the Middle East and North Africa. Broadly defined, digital labour refers to employment that is mediated or enabled by digital technologies. Examples include digital platform-based gig work, remote freelancing, and other online or ICT-facilitated jobs. In a region where inequality and labour informality continue to shape both access to, and outcomes of, digital employment, shifts in digital labour demand urgent and inclusive policy responses.   Qatar and Lebanon – two states with structural and [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/navigating-digital-labour-transitions-in-mena-lessons-from-qatar-and-lebanon/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Realignment in the Maghreb: How Algeria is shaping Tunisia’s political trajectory</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/realignment-in-the-maghreb-how-algeria-is-shaping-tunisias-political-trajectory/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/realignment-in-the-maghreb-how-algeria-is-shaping-tunisias-political-trajectory/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Safae El Yaaqoubi]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2025 12:17:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[North Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Algeria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tunisia]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5226</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[When Tunisia’s political crisis began in 2021, it was widely viewed as a domestic breakdown, driven by institutional gridlock, economic pressure, and President Kais Saied’s consolidation of power. But as Tunisia grew more isolated, external actors, most notably Algeria, began exerting greater influence over its trajectory. Algeria has since taken a more assertive role, offering [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/articles/realignment-in-the-maghreb-how-algeria-is-shaping-tunisias-political-trajectory/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
