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	<title>Kalam</title>
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	<title>Kalam</title>
	<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org</link>
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	<item>
		<title>Iran’s calculus: Negotiations through deterrence and leverage</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/irans-calculus-negotiations-through-deterrence-and-leverage/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/irans-calculus-negotiations-through-deterrence-and-leverage/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Faezeh Foroutan]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 15:49:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5632</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In a Fox News interview on 6 August 2026, US Vice President JD Vance said Iran’s leadership is divided between those favouring negotiations and those ‘crazy radicals’ wanting the war to continue. His description reflects a broader misunderstanding in Washington, which tends to view Iranian decision-making as a simple choice between diplomacy and confrontation. However, [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/irans-calculus-negotiations-through-deterrence-and-leverage/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Can Syria reform its banks without reproducing elite capture?</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/can-syria-reform-its-banks-without-reproducing-elite-capture/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/can-syria-reform-its-banks-without-reproducing-elite-capture/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Haddon Barth]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 11:51:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5607</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Much of Syria’s reconstruction strategy has centred on attracting large-scale investment from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and other international partners into energy, telecommunications, ports, airports and real estate. While these projects are important, they are unlikely on their own to generate broad-based economic recovery. That recovery also rests on improving livelihoods around the country: whether farmers can purchase equipment and small businesses can access working capital. In other words, the success of reconstruction [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/can-syria-reform-its-banks-without-reproducing-elite-capture/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Sanctions have reshaped, rather than weakened, the economic model of Iraq’s armed groups</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/sanctions-have-reshaped-rather-than-weakened-the-economic-model-of-iraqs-armed-groups/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/sanctions-have-reshaped-rather-than-weakened-the-economic-model-of-iraqs-armed-groups/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ali Hussein Al-Khafajy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 Aug 2026 10:11:02 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Political economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5601</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Mounting US pressure on the financing channels of armed groups in Iraq may not weaken their influence as much as it pushes them to restructure their economy. As sanctions and other restrictions tighten on banks, individuals and companies linked to these groups, they are increasingly inclined to deepen their reliance on domestic sources of revenue and networks of influence within state [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/sanctions-have-reshaped-rather-than-weakened-the-economic-model-of-iraqs-armed-groups/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>How digital governance can revitalize Lebanon’s municipalities</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-digital-governance-can-revitalize-lebanons-municipalities/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-digital-governance-can-revitalize-lebanons-municipalities/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Awkar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 11:43:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5590</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) offer a pragmatic path to restore Lebanon’s municipalities, by empowering youth and streamlining fund allocation – provided the risks of coercion and technical vulnerability are carefully managed. Lebanon’s presidential vacuum, which began in October 2022, halted the state’s executive function for more than two years, and parliament postponed municipal elections for [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-digital-governance-can-revitalize-lebanons-municipalities/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Gulf energy can bypass the Strait of Hormuz, but only with political unity</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/gulf-energy-can-bypass-the-strait-of-hormuz-but-only-with-political-unity/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/gulf-energy-can-bypass-the-strait-of-hormuz-but-only-with-political-unity/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Naser Alsayed]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 09:43:57 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Gulf]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Political economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5576</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz poses a major threat to the economic security of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which remain heavily dependent on hydrocarbon export revenues. As a result, developing alternative export routes to reduce reliance on the Strait has become an urgent priority. Although there is an urgent need to [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/gulf-energy-can-bypass-the-strait-of-hormuz-but-only-with-political-unity/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>A new prime minister in Iraq, but the same old struggle with corruption</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/a-new-prime-minister-in-iraq-but-the-same-old-struggle-with-corruption/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/a-new-prime-minister-in-iraq-but-the-same-old-struggle-with-corruption/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sajad Jiyad]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 09:53:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5564</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Iraq’s Supreme Sovereign Council for Integrity, Oversight, and Recovery of Public Funds, created and led by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi in May 2026, is yet another example of anti-corruption bodies being introduced in Iraq while the core problem of impunity remains. Since 2003, numerous commissions, audit offices, parliamentary committees, strategies and councils, have been established, yet corruption continues to drain public resources and erode trust in the government.  The [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/a-new-prime-minister-in-iraq-but-the-same-old-struggle-with-corruption/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Victory amid war: What Iraqi football reveals about state-citizen relations</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/victory-amid-war-what-iraqi-football-reveals-about-state-citizen-relations/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/victory-amid-war-what-iraqi-football-reveals-about-state-citizen-relations/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Abdulla Al-Kalisy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Jun 2026 12:24:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5553</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In Iraq, outside of large-scale protest movements, I have witnessed two broad displays of social unity. Both emerged from football. The 2007 Asian Cup victory and Iraq’s World Cup qualification in April 2026 produced mass national celebrations that cut across sectarian and ethnic lines. In 2007, among family who had fled to Syria to escape [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/victory-amid-war-what-iraqi-football-reveals-about-state-citizen-relations/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Gulf investment in Africa: opportunity, asymmetry and the risk of dependence</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/gulf-investment-in-africa-opportunity-asymmetry-and-the-risk-of-dependence/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/gulf-investment-in-africa-opportunity-asymmetry-and-the-risk-of-dependence/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Turhan Hizli]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 16:36:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Gulf]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[External actors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Political economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5537</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Gulf states are no longer peripheral players in Africa’s political economy. Over the last decade, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have invested over $100 billion in Africa, led by the UAE with $59.4 billion, followed by Saudi Arabia at $25.6 billion, while bilateral trade has surged to $121 billion. The UAE is now Africa’s fourth-largest [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/gulf-investment-in-africa-opportunity-asymmetry-and-the-risk-of-dependence/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Closing in: How the US–Israel war on Iran is shrinking civic space in Iraq</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/closing-in-how-the-us-israel-war-on-iran-is-shrinking-civic-space-in-iraq/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/closing-in-how-the-us-israel-war-on-iran-is-shrinking-civic-space-in-iraq/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Layla Amer]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2026 11:09:33 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5516</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The US–Israel war on Iran has exposed the fragility of civic space in Iraq. Security threats against civil society groups and restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly are longstanding features of Iraq’s civic environment. However, the conflict has intensified these pressures: as armed actors have expanded their influence, state institutions have weakened further, and public discourse has become [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/closing-in-how-the-us-israel-war-on-iran-is-shrinking-civic-space-in-iraq/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Syria on moving sands: why the SDF–Damascus settlement defers rather than resolves conflict</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/syria-on-moving-sands-why-the-sdf-damascus-settlement-defers-rather-than-resolves-conflict/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/syria-on-moving-sands-why-the-sdf-damascus-settlement-defers-rather-than-resolves-conflict/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rana Khalaf]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 15:36:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conflict & violence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5509</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The agreement between Syria’s interim government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to integrate Kurdish forces into state institutions is being read by commentators as a step towards establishing unified state control over armed actors and offering a degree of decentralization to Kurdish-majority areas. However, such readings miss a critical issue. The settlement disadvantages the SDF, reversing much of its conflict-born territorial and resource gains, and [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/syria-on-moving-sands-why-the-sdf-damascus-settlement-defers-rather-than-resolves-conflict/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
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