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	<title>Levant &#8211; Kalam</title>
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	<title>Levant &#8211; Kalam</title>
	<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org</link>
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	<item>
		<title>Can Syria reform its banks without reproducing elite capture?</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/can-syria-reform-its-banks-without-reproducing-elite-capture/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/can-syria-reform-its-banks-without-reproducing-elite-capture/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Haddon Barth]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 11:51:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5607</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Much of Syria’s reconstruction strategy has centred on attracting large-scale investment from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and other international partners into energy, telecommunications, ports, airports and real estate. While these projects are important, they are unlikely on their own to generate broad-based economic recovery. That recovery also rests on improving livelihoods around the country: whether farmers can purchase equipment and small businesses can access working capital. In other words, the success of reconstruction [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/can-syria-reform-its-banks-without-reproducing-elite-capture/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>How digital governance can revitalize Lebanon’s municipalities</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-digital-governance-can-revitalize-lebanons-municipalities/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-digital-governance-can-revitalize-lebanons-municipalities/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kevin Awkar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 11:43:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recent]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5590</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) offer a pragmatic path to restore Lebanon’s municipalities, by empowering youth and streamlining fund allocation – provided the risks of coercion and technical vulnerability are carefully managed. Lebanon’s presidential vacuum, which began in October 2022, halted the state’s executive function for more than two years, and parliament postponed municipal elections for [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-digital-governance-can-revitalize-lebanons-municipalities/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Syria on moving sands: why the SDF–Damascus settlement defers rather than resolves conflict</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/syria-on-moving-sands-why-the-sdf-damascus-settlement-defers-rather-than-resolves-conflict/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/syria-on-moving-sands-why-the-sdf-damascus-settlement-defers-rather-than-resolves-conflict/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rana Khalaf]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 15:36:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conflict & violence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5509</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The agreement between Syria’s interim government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to integrate Kurdish forces into state institutions is being read by commentators as a step towards establishing unified state control over armed actors and offering a degree of decentralization to Kurdish-majority areas. However, such readings miss a critical issue. The settlement disadvantages the SDF, reversing much of its conflict-born territorial and resource gains, and [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/syria-on-moving-sands-why-the-sdf-damascus-settlement-defers-rather-than-resolves-conflict/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Beyond informality: A formal roadmap for Syrian refugees in Lebanon</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/beyond-informality-a-formal-roadmap-for-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/beyond-informality-a-formal-roadmap-for-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Carmen Geha]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Apr 2026 14:26:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5481</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The Middle East hosts the highest per capita number of refugees and displaced persons in the world, and nowhere is this more acutely felt than in Lebanon. But Lebanon’s refugee protection frameworks are under growing pressure: international donor support has shrunk amid its economic crisis, UN agencies face mounting funding risks, and human rights are [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/beyond-informality-a-formal-roadmap-for-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Sweida: A lens on Syria’s illiberal peace</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/sweida-a-lens-on-syrias-illiberal-peace/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/sweida-a-lens-on-syrias-illiberal-peace/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rana Khalaf]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2026 17:01:33 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5350</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The evolving map of territorial control of Al-Sharaa’s interim authority (government and aligned groups), from its takeover of large swathes of Syria’s northeast to its agreed demilitarised economic zone with Israel in the south, could be argued as delivering short-term stabilisation. In the long term, stabilisation remains subject to a broader reality: Al-Sharaa’s interim government [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/sweida-a-lens-on-syrias-illiberal-peace/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Navigating digital labour transitions in MENA: Lessons from Qatar and Lebanon</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/navigating-digital-labour-transitions-in-mena-lessons-from-qatar-and-lebanon/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/navigating-digital-labour-transitions-in-mena-lessons-from-qatar-and-lebanon/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sara Cherqaoui]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2025 10:31:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gulf]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Political economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Qatar]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=5234</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Digital transformation is reshaping labour markets across the Middle East and North Africa. Broadly defined, digital labour refers to employment that is mediated or enabled by digital technologies. Examples include digital platform-based gig work, remote freelancing, and other online or ICT-facilitated jobs. In a region where inequality and labour informality continue to shape both access to, and outcomes of, digital employment, shifts in digital labour demand urgent and inclusive policy responses.   Qatar and Lebanon – two states with structural and [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/navigating-digital-labour-transitions-in-mena-lessons-from-qatar-and-lebanon/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>A careful balancing act: Turkey-Iran competition in regional Kurdish geopolitics</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/a-careful-balancing-act-turkey-iran-competition-in-regional-kurdish-geopolitics/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/a-careful-balancing-act-turkey-iran-competition-in-regional-kurdish-geopolitics/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Winthrop Rodgers]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 May 2025 09:26:24 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Regional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=4862</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[By virtue of geography and demography, Kurdish populations will always play a role in relations between Turkey and Iran. Both countries are accused of marginalizing and oppressing their own Kurdish communities, and oppose Kurdish self-determination at home and around the region. Yet, they also tactically support Kurdish groups in the neighbouring countries of Iraq and [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/a-careful-balancing-act-turkey-iran-competition-in-regional-kurdish-geopolitics/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Syria’s governance dilemma amid Turkey–Iran competition</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/syrias-governance-dilemma-amid-turkey-iran-competition/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/syrias-governance-dilemma-amid-turkey-iran-competition/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Haid Haid]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Apr 2025 10:49:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=4852</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Syria’s post-Assad transition marks a defining moment – one that presents both immense opportunities and complex challenges. Among the most critical and contentious debates is the model of governance that will shape Syria’s future. This issue is pivotal not only because of its far-reaching impact on daily life, and public services and institutions, but because [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/syrias-governance-dilemma-amid-turkey-iran-competition/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Assad’s fall ends drug smuggling – but trafficking to Jordan persists</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/assads-fall-ends-drug-smuggling-but-trafficking-to-jordan-persists/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/assads-fall-ends-drug-smuggling-but-trafficking-to-jordan-persists/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Haid Haid]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Mar 2025 10:16:45 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Jordan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=4769</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 was met with widespread relief – not only among Syrians but among regional actors eager to move past its destabilizing, criminal enterprises. Hopes were highest that Syria’s trade in Captagon – the highly addictive drug that, under Assad, flooded regional markets via Jordan – would come [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/assads-fall-ends-drug-smuggling-but-trafficking-to-jordan-persists/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Hezbollah’s smuggling lifeline: can Syria’s new authorities cut it off?</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/hezbollahs-smuggling-lifeline-can-syrias-new-authorities-cut-it-off/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/hezbollahs-smuggling-lifeline-can-syrias-new-authorities-cut-it-off/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Haid Haid]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Mar 2025 12:40:06 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=4761</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Since the ouster of the Assad regime in December 2024, the transitional authorities in Damascus have repeatedly vowed to sever Hezbollah’s reliance on Syria as a key smuggling corridor. For over a decade, it is reported that the group has freely moved drugs, money, and weapons through Syrian territory to finance and arm itself. In [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/hezbollahs-smuggling-lifeline-can-syrias-new-authorities-cut-it-off/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
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