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	<title>Lina Khatib &#8211; Kalam</title>
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	<title>Lina Khatib &#8211; Kalam</title>
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	<item>
		<title>How the Captagon trade impacts border communities in Lebanon and Syria</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-the-captagon-trade-impacts-border-communities-in-lebanon-and-syria/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-the-captagon-trade-impacts-border-communities-in-lebanon-and-syria/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lina Khatib]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 25 Jul 2022 12:31:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conflict & violence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Political economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=1765</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Any policy designed to counter the growing Captagon trade must take into account its impact on local border communities. The growing Captagon trade in Syria and Lebanon has been given much attention in recent months. The networks involved in this trade, such as the Fourth Division of the Syrian Arab Army and other smaller armed [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-the-captagon-trade-impacts-border-communities-in-lebanon-and-syria/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Tackling corruption is focus for MENA in 2022</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/tackling-corruption-is-focus-for-mena-in-2022/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/tackling-corruption-is-focus-for-mena-in-2022/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lina Khatib]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 02 Feb 2022 11:49:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Regional]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=1705</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[To tackle corruption in the MENA region, the international community must prioritize accountability over stability. Tackling entrenched corruption will be a key focus of the political discourse in the Middle East and North Africa in 2022. International policymakers will look to anti-corruption as a framework that can be used to help stabilize conflict countries, support [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/tackling-corruption-is-focus-for-mena-in-2022/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>How Hezbollah holds sway over the Lebanese state</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-the-lebanese-state/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-the-lebanese-state/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lina Khatib]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Jun 2021 10:51:56 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=1638</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[As a hybrid actor, Hezbollah has risen to become the most influential political organization in Lebanon. It enjoys legitimacy within the Lebanese state, but is able to operate without the accountability required of a state institution and without full responsibility to the Lebanese people. Holding power without responsibility is ideal for Hezbollah. In theory, the [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/how-hezbollah-holds-sway-over-the-lebanese-state/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Where is the ‘state’ in Iraq and Lebanon?</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/where-is-the-state-in-iraq-and-lebanon/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/where-is-the-state-in-iraq-and-lebanon/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lina Khatib]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Apr 2021 10:25:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Iraq]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lebanon]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=1582</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[This paper explores the nature of social power in Iraq and Lebanon, and its implications for understanding the role of the state in both countries. The paper argues that the very concept of the &#8216;state&#8217;, as often understood by Western policymakers, implies a binary division between official and unofficial structures &#8211; between state and non-state [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/where-is-the-state-in-iraq-and-lebanon/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: What His Death Means For ISIS in Syria</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-what-his-death-means-for-isis-in-syria/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-what-his-death-means-for-isis-in-syria/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lina Khatib]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Nov 2019 07:57:05 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=1370</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi does not mean the automatic end of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). But the immediate future of ISIS depends more on local dynamics in Syria than on whether it still has a leader or not. Baghdadi was a powerful tool for ISIS, especially at a time when [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-what-his-death-means-for-isis-in-syria/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Syria’s Transactional State: How the Conflict Changed the Syrian State’s Exercise of Power</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/syrias-transactional-state-how-the-conflict-changed-the-syrian-states-exercise-of-power/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/syrias-transactional-state-how-the-conflict-changed-the-syrian-states-exercise-of-power/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lina Khatib]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Oct 2018 11:41:18 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[External actors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=1134</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Summary The Syrian conflict has changed the functions, capacity and agency of the principal institutions through which the state exercises control, namely the security agencies and the army. This has transformed Syria from a ‘shadow state’ dominated by the security apparatus into a ‘transactional state’ dominated by regime-aligned profiteers. President Bashar al-Assad’s rise to power [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/syrias-transactional-state-how-the-conflict-changed-the-syrian-states-exercise-of-power/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Syria’s Transactional State</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/syrias-transactional-state/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/syrias-transactional-state/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lina Khatib]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Oct 2018 11:38:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[External actors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=1130</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[How the Conflict Changed the Syrian State’s Exercise of Power The Syrian regime has become increasingly reliant on profiteers and external actors – specifically, Russia and Iran – pursuing their own interests. Click here to download this research paper in Arabic.]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/syrias-transactional-state/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Growing Role of Pro-regime Militias in Syria</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/the-growing-role-of-pro-regime-militias-in-syria/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/the-growing-role-of-pro-regime-militias-in-syria/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lina Khatib]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Aug 2017 18:47:40 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conflict & violence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance & accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=822</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[As the battles for Deir Ezzor and Raqqa escalate, the Syrian regime is escalating its own rhetoric about regaining state authority in those areas. But the dynamics between the Syrian army and pro-regime militias show that the matter of state authority is not straightforward. The Syrian regime is relying on Iran-backed militias in the battlefield [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/the-growing-role-of-pro-regime-militias-in-syria/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Why the liberation of Raqqa will not bring stability to Syria</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/why-the-liberation-of-raqqa-will-not-bring-stability-to-syria/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/why-the-liberation-of-raqqa-will-not-bring-stability-to-syria/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lina Khatib]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Jun 2017 18:09:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Conflict & violence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=753</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The battle to liberate Raqqa from ISIS has started and reports of areas that are being taken back from the terrorist organization are already emerging. The United States and its allies are presenting the campaign in positive terms, saying that stripping the so-called ‘caliphate’ from its capital will be a significant blow to ISIS. But [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/why-the-liberation-of-raqqa-will-not-bring-stability-to-syria/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Iran Is Building a Base of Post-War Influence in Syria</title>
		<link>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/iran-is-building-a-base-of-post-war-influence-in-syria/</link>
					<comments>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/iran-is-building-a-base-of-post-war-influence-in-syria/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lina Khatib]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 31 May 2017 17:49:20 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Levant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geopolitics & security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/?p=728</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[President Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia and Israel in May carried with it multiple statements about Iran’s role in sponsoring militias in the Middle East. Tehran responded by pointing out Saudi Arabia’s own military involvement in other countries in the region, yet without refuting what Trump said about Iranian sponsorship for militias. Over the past [&#8230;]]]></description>
		
					<wfw:commentRss>https://kalam.chathamhouse.org/iran-is-building-a-base-of-post-war-influence-in-syria/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
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