On 10 December 2025, the European Union’s High Representative to Egypt issued a statement in honour of Human Rights Day, encouraging the Egyptian audience to ‘…continue building a world where human rights are lived – every day, by everyone.’ However, the EU’s engagement with Egypt on refugee rights stands in contrast to this statement.
Months earlier, in October 2025, Brussels hosted the first-ever Egypt–European Union summit. At the summit, the EU agreed to a €75 million increase in the European Commission’s financial support to Egypt. The funding is the latest agreement linked to the March 2024 EU–Egypt Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership, under which the EU committed 7.4 billion euros intended to support Egypt’s economy and ‘avert another migration crisis in Europe’.
A joint statement issued following the summit stated that both actors will continue support for ‘migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and host communities in full respect of international law and in line with national frameworks.’ However, Egypt’s December 2024 asylum law and the EU’s recent decision to designate Egypt as a ‘safe third country’ do not follow through on these commitments, exposing a gap between stated principles and policy implementation.
These developments also highlight how the EU offers financial incentives in exchange for security cooperation in the Mediterranean, in contradiction with its own obligations under refugee rights conventions. The EU can and should do more to ensure its support provides greater accountability for rights abuses.
Protection and rights concerns for asylum seekers in Egypt
Prior to the passing of Egypt’s National Asylum Law No. 164 in December 2024, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) oversaw asylum procedures and protection services in Egypt, often in partnership with non-governmental organizations. However, human rights groups and analysts have raised significant concerns that parts of Law No. 164 fail to comply with Egypt’s ‘international and constitutional obligations and do not effectively safeguard the rights of asylum seekers and refugees’.
These concerns centre on the ability of Law No. 164 to restrict migrants’ right to apply for asylum and authorizes the revocation of refugee status. Amnesty International has highlighted that these provisions exceed the exclusion clauses set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention.
Under the law, migrants who enter Egypt irregularly are barred from applying for refugee status. Since Egypt introduced mandatory visas for all Sudanese citizens in June 2024, many have faced prohibitive costs – $1,500–$2,500 per person – and months-long delays, forcing them to enter irregularly.
Estimates suggest there are over 1.5 million displaced Sudanese people in Egypt – more than any other African country. The UNHCR has called for the international community to support Egypt, calling the burden on the country ‘unsustainable.’ But UN experts have recently warned that ‘arbitrary arrest and deportations’ target refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in Egypt, ‘with refugee communities being targeted in their homes, workplaces and even in refugee led service centres.’
Law No. 164 excludes asylum seekers from basic rights protections, including protection from refoulement, the forcible return to countries where there is a risk of persecution. The law also imposes penalties, including possible imprisonment, on people who provide accommodation or work opportunities to asylum seekers without notifying authorities, further curtailing the ability of civil society organizations to provide support to refugees.
Another element of concern is that Article 8 of the Law permits the revocation of refugee status for those who ‘fail to uphold Egyptian societal values and traditions’, raising fears that some migrant populations could have their legal status stripped on discriminatory grounds. Migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa can reportedly face racism and xenophobia in Egypt, as well as a lack of protection or redress from state authorities.
Despite the concerns of the UN and international organizations about Law No. 164 and the protection environment for asylum seekers in Egypt, the EU continues its support.
Implications of recent EU ‘safe country’ legislation
The EU’s funding to Egypt is also concurrent with its designation of Egypt as a ‘safe country of origin’ and expansion of the safe third country principle. Considering Law No. 164 and allegations by organizations like Human Rights Watch of repression of speech and civic space by the Egyptian government, these policy developments further indicate how the EU is appearing to prioritize border securitization over human rights commitments.
On 10 February 2026, the European Parliament approved changes to EU asylum legislation that expand the use of the ‘safe third country’ concept, allowing asylum claims to be deemed inadmissible. Under the new rules, due to take effect in June 2026, member states will be able to apply the concept if the applicant transited through a ‘safe’ country, or where there is an arrangement with the third country for a person’s asylum request to be processed there.
Rights groups warn that under the EU’s own legal guidelines, Egypt is unlikely to meet the standards for designation as a safe third country. Indeed, a March 2026 warning from UN experts, and investigative reporting alleging mass deportations of Sudanese asylum seekers carried out by Egyptian authorities suggest that Egypt cannot be considered to ensure protection against refoulement for asylum seekers, a principle enshrined in EU law.
Separate legislation, also in effect from June 2026, introduces an EU-wide list of ‘safe countries of origin’. Applicants from these countries will be channelled through an accelerated process and presumed not to require protection. Egypt is included on this list.
Amnesty International, in a joint statement signed by over 50 organizations, warned that both policy changes ‘risk seriously undermining people’s access to fair and full asylum procedures in Europe.’
EU–Egypt deal and lessons from Tunisia
The EU–Egypt partnership marks the latest externalization agreement between EU and non-European Mediterranean countries that financially incentivizes migration control and further border externalization. The EU signed a similar deal with Tunisia in 2023. The deal included no specific human rights guarantees for migrants and asylum seekers, despite allegations by Human Rights Watch of systemic abuse of migrants and asylum seekers by Tunisian state security forces. Tunisia demonstrates the risks and consequences of funding migration control without accountability mechanisms in place.
Migrants face limited access to services, and authorities have also forcibly displaced individuals to Tunisia’s borders. A 2024 investigation by The Guardian alleged that Tunisia’s national guard physically and sexually assaulted migrants, including children. In January 2025, the EU stated it would reevaluate its payments to Tunisia to make funding more contingent on human rights standards, despite previously stating there was no wrongdoing. However, specifics of planned or implemented changes remain unclear.
The EU’s continued commitment to a similar partnership framework, and payments related to migration security, in Egypt – despite abuses like those highlighted by UN experts, and potential violations of the 1951 Convention – suggests it has not meaningfully adapted its approach and may indicate a continued prioritization of border securitization over commitments to human rights and protection principles.
What the EU should do next
The EU’s funding to Egypt under the cooperation agreement, seen in the broader context of Egypt’s new migration law and its designation as a ‘safe country of origin’, appears to reflect a political imperative to secure borders over a rights-based approach.
To remain compliant with its own legal framework, the EU should remove Egypt from the ‘safe countries of origin’ and ‘safe third countries’ lists. Otherwise, the EU and member states may face legal challenges for violating principles of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
More broadly, the EU should use its financial leverage to pressure the Egyptian government to revise the 2024 Asylum Law and strengthen protections for migrants and asylum seekers. Future financial support should be conditional on restrictive provisions – including Article 8 – and an end to the deportation of asylum seekers back to Sudan. Building on actions taken in Tunisia, the EU should introduce transparent accountability mechanisms and make further payments contingent on clear human rights standards, as legally established in the 1951 Convention.
Egyptian policymakers are likely to oppose such changes due to concerns about increased migration pressures and the strain on already underfunded social services. As such, the EU needs to focus on supporting Egypt’s economy to make the country more liveable for all residents. The EU should condition further funding on Egypt taking steps to address drivers of the current socio-economic crisis, including increasing transparency around state and military-connected firms and regulating the military’s role in the economy.
Ignoring Egypt’s domestic situation also comes with risks for the EU. Egyptians are now the largest African nationality entering Europe irregularly, reflecting years of worsening socio-economic conditions. Without addressing these drivers, Egypt is likely to remain a major country of origin for migration.
