When Tunisia’s political crisis began in 2021, it was widely viewed as a domestic breakdown, driven by institutional gridlock, economic pressure, and President Kais Saied’s consolidation of power. But as Tunisia grew more isolated, external actors, most notably Algeria, began exerting greater influence over its trajectory. Algeria has since taken a more assertive role, offering financial support, coordinating diplomatically and deepening security ties.
Tunisia’s trajectory marks a shift in how power is exercised in the Maghreb – less through formal alliances or ideological blocs, and more through economic ties, political shielding and managed isolation. While rooted in Tunisia’s own crisis, this relationship is illustrative of how Algeria, facing an increasingly unfriendly neighbourhood, turns its defensive reflexes into leverage, constraining Tunisia’s room for manoeuvre and assuming a gatekeeping role on the eastern edge of the Maghreb.
Tunisia’s crisis and Algeria’s deepening financial and economic influence
Tunisia’s reliance on Algeria deepened following Saied’s July 2021 power consolidation, which left the country isolated from Western partners. While Algeria had provided [political and financial] support earlier, its leverage grew as Tunisia’s relations deteriorated. When IMF negotiations stalled, Algeria extended financial assistance, beginning with a $150 million deposit in 2020, followed by a $300 million loan in 2021, and a 2022 package totalling $300 million, split between a credit line and a grant. Support continued into 2025 with over 22,000 tons of liquefied gas.
Algeria builds further influence in Tunisia through quiet dependencies tied to energy, essential goods and local livelihoods. As of mid-2023, 47% of Tunisia’s natural gas consumption, powering nearly all electricity, was imported from Algeria. This is a source of leverage amid fragility, as Algiers controls volumes and pricing. While it has not openly weaponized this leverage, Tunisia’s electricity supply remains structurally exposed to shifts in Algerian terms.
Beyond official energy flows, Algeria’s influence also plays out through tacitly permitted cross-border movement of subsidized goods and fuel. Tolerated by local authorities, the flows have created a parallel economy that accounts for much of regional trade and an intermittent but impactful source of economic relief in Tunisia’s interior border regions. They also provide Algeria with an informal lever of pressure, since delays or restrictions at the frontier can quickly disrupt supplies and expose Tunisia’s dependence on this parallel economy.
After the Bouraoui affair – discussed below— Algerian customs reportedly blocked more than 200 Tunisian vehicles and imposed new restrictions on goods transport. The disruptions ended only after President Abdelmadjid Tebboune publicly ordered the easing of the measures, a directive carried across Algeria’s official news outlets and interpreted in Tunisian media as a deliberate signal to Saied. By toggling access on and off, Algeria turned cross-border trade into a tool of pressure, a reminder that Tunis’ room for manoeuvre often depends on its neighbour’s discreet leverage.
Compared to direct intervention, sustaining a cooperative government in Tunis enables Algeria to contain rival inroads and manage regional instability on favourable terms, limiting both the risks of spillover and the scope of rival influence.
Strategic alignment in the shadow of Algeria
Tunisia’s foreign posture has evolved in ways that suggest closer alignment with Algeria. Historically, Tunis has maintained positive neutrality on Western Sahara, balancing ties with Algeria and Morocco. In recent years, however, it appears more attuned to Algerian sensitivities.
That shift surfaced in October 2021, when Tunisia abstained on a UN Security Council resolution renewing the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), echoing Algeria’s objections. In August 2022, Tunisia hosted Polisario leader Brahim Ghali at the Eighth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in Tunis. The visit prompted a rupture with Morocco and underscored Tunisia’s break from its traditional nonalignment.
From deference to dependency: Tunisia’s diplomatic erosion
Tunisia’s posture toward Algeria is increasingly defined by diplomatic deference. In 2023, Amira Bouraoui, a dual French-Algerian activist facing prosecution in Algeria, entered Tunisia and travelled to France under French diplomatic protection. Algiers condemned the incident as a ‘breach of national sovereignty’ and recalled its ambassador from Paris. Rather than defending its own jurisdiction or asserting procedural independence, Tunis issued no response. Shortly afterward, Saied dismissed Foreign Minister Othman Jerandi. Though no official link was provided, the timing fuelled perceptions that the dismissal was also a gesture to reassure Algiers. Reports that Saied personally approved Bouraoui’s exit reinforced this reading, casting Jerandi’s removal as a calculated concession to contain the crisis. The episode underscored a broader pattern: dependency is taking shape through anticipation and accommodation, with Tunis narrowing its diplomatic options pre-emptively to avoid Algerian displeasure.
This asymmetry extends into the symbolic domain. Algerian commentators referred to Tunisia as an Algerian ‘wilaya’ (province), a slight that drew no rebuttal from Tunis. The silence reflects a shift from Tunisia’s traditionally independent diplomacy. Public backlash on social media underscored the reputational costs of such passivity.
Algeria’s self-presentation as a guarantor of Tunisian stability has reinforced this dynamic. In May 2023, Algeria’s ambassador to Italy declared that Algiers was working with Rome ‘to preserve stability in Tunisia’, a formulation widely criticized for overstepping diplomatic norms. A year earlier, Tebboune publicly offered support to help Tunisia ‘return to the path of democracy’. Though later softened, the statement underscored Algeria’s growing comfort in asserting a custodial role.
Security convergence and institutional resemblance
By shielding Tunisia from external pressure, Algiers has allowed Saied to reverse reforms under the banner of sovereignty, a rhetorical posture shaped in part by Algeria’s own post-Hirak narrative.
Tunisia’s legal trajectory today diverges from earlier authoritarian models under Presidents Habib Bourguiba and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. While both used repression, Bourguiba’s regime blended legality with paternalism, whereas Ben Ali relied on emergency laws to criminalize dissent. Under Saied, the legal framework is formally apolitical but functionally repressive, drawing more from Algeria’s model. Charges citing conspiracy and the use of exceptional courts reflect a vocabulary rooted in ambiguity and flexibility, consistent with Algerian practices. This signals not simply a domestic authoritarian turn, but the emergence of a hybrid model: locally grounded, regionally aligned.
Bilateral security cooperation increasingly operates through informal channels, marked by selective enforcement and reciprocal intelligence coordination. One case saw an Algerian activist apprehended in Tunis and returned to Algeria despite Tunisia’s obligations under the Refugee Convention; another involved the arrest of a former Tunisian intelligence chief in Algeria and his transfer to Tunis.
Strategic drift in the Maghreb
Unlike Morocco, which has recalibrated its foreign policy toward Africa, with a particular emphasis on the Atlantic dimension, and Algeria, which remains tied to non-alignment, Tunisia now lacks a defined orientation. Its posture is increasingly reactive, shaped by Algerian leverage, fragmented Western disengagement, and internal survival.
Tunisia’s drift has turned it from a regional balancer into a passive actor within an Algerian-led axis. It no longer defines its foreign policy, invests in trilateral diplomacy or pursues multilateral integration. As a result, its influence across Africa, the Mediterranean and the Maghreb is narrowing. In the long term, this drift may prove more destabilizing than external pressure. Alignment with Algeria is happening not by design, but by inertia, through economic dependency, diplomatic passivity and institutional isolation. Over time, this loss of regional agency risks becoming normalized. What was once a transitional phase is calcifying into a status quo: a Tunisia no longer shaping its neighbourhood but shaped by it.
