In recent years, the South Caucasus has become a microcosm of multipolarity, with Russia, Turkey and Iran competing for influence and navigating a fragile mix of cooperation and rivalry. The post-Cold War regional order – dominated by Russia and defined by its standoff with the West – was structured around two main axes: the Russia–Armenia–Iran bloc, which upheld the status quo of Russian dominance, and the Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey axis, which leaned towards the West, with Georgia championing Euro-Atlantic integration and Turkey supporting its NATO ambitions.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine led to the decline of its once-uncontested hegemony in the South Caucasus, ushering in a more fragmented regional order. While still in flux, three key features are emerging: imbalanced multipolarity, fluid patterns of cooperation and rivalry, and growing interconnection between the South Caucasus and the Middle East. Several factors have contributed to this shift, including the intensifying Turkey–Iran rivalry across both regions, competition over strategic connectivity projects, and the concurrent decline of Russian and Western influence.
Imbalanced multipolarity as the new regional order
The South Caucasus has traditionally fallen within Russia’s sphere of influence, solidified in the 19th century through the defeat of Persian and Ottoman rivals, and the incorporation of the three Caucasian nations – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – into the Russian Empire and later the USSR. In the post-Soviet period, Vladimir Putin’s Russia prioritized control over the Caucasus, motivated by concerns over domestic stability in the volatile Northern Caucasus and by global ambitions to project power across the wider Black Sea region, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. However, the Ukraine war has stretched Russia’s strategic bandwidth, prompting a reassessment of its regional priorities and a reluctant acceptance of growing influence from other regional actors, notably Turkey and Iran.
Recent interactions among Russia, Turkey and Iran – alongside China’s rising influence and, to a lesser extent, Israel’s – have given rise to a regional order best described as imbalanced multipolarity. Although Russia has lost its uncontested hegemony, it remains the dominant power through its military presence, economic clout, and depth of political influence. It still maintains a base in Gyumri, Armenia, and troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia – regions of Georgia that it effectively occupies. Moscow has also capitalized on Georgia’s pivot away from the West, which had previously served as a key conduit of European and Euro-Atlantic influence.
Conversely, Russia has seen its traditional support in Armenia wane, with Yerevan increasingly seeking closer ties with the EU and the US. Yet Armenia’s capacity for strategic realignment remains limited. A recent foreign ministerial meeting between Sergei Lavrov and Ararat Mirzoyan suggests that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government is exploring a re-engagement with Moscow. Russia’s potential success in Ukraine could further bolster its standing in the South Caucasus, especially as smaller states in the region may feel increasingly vulnerable to an emboldened and neo-imperialist Russia.
At present, the main constraint on Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus is the strengthening of the Azerbaijan–Turkey axis, coupled with Moscow’s wartime prioritization of Ukraine and building support for its campaign in the Global South. Turkey’s expanding role has, in turn, prompted increased Iranian engagement in the region, underpinned by the logic of multipolar competition. While Moscow leaned towards Azerbaijan and Turkey, Iran has emerged as Armenia’s principal external supporter.
The previously lopsided power dynamic favouring Russia has been recalibrated, but the willingness and capacity of regional powers to challenge Moscow’s influence in the Caucasus should not be overstated. The situation remains fluid, shaped by developments in Ukraine and the Middle East. While Turkey has emerged strengthened from the Syrian conflict, Iran has been significantly weakened by the fall of the Assad regime and the erosion of its Axis of Resistance. Recent Israeli and US strikes have pushed Tehran further into regime survival mode, limiting its ability to project influence in the South Caucasus at least for the time being.
Iran’s weakening, in turn, increases Armenia’s incentive to normalize relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan while treading carefully with Russia. Prime Minister Pashinyan’s historic visit to Ankara underscores the tangible thaw in Armenia–Turkey relations, which could further sideline both Iran and Russia. When Moscow finds time to refocus on the Caucasus, however, it will seek to regain some, if not all, of its lost influence in the region, leading to a new equilibrium with Turkey and Iran and limiting the regional presence of the EU and the US.
Areas of cooperation and contestation
The collapse of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and Azerbaijan’s restoration of territorial control with Turkish support, marked a strategic turning point for the South Caucasus, reshaping the regional balance of power. Simultaneously, Western sanctions on Russia and Iran have heightened the region’s importance as a transit hub for both sanctioned states and those seeking to bypass or enforce trade restrictions. This has ignited a ‘competition of corridors’, with rival connectivity initiatives backed by various regional and global actors.
Three major connectivity corridors are taking shape: the Middle Corridor (linking Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey while bypassing Armenia, Russia and Iran); the International North–South Transport Corridor (backed by Russia and Iran); and Iran’s proposed Persian Gulf–Black Sea Corridor involving Armenia, Georgia, Bulgaria and Greece. To unlock its transit potential, Armenia is keen to reach a peace agreement with Azerbaijan and normalise relations with Turkey. Baku and Tehran have also sought to settle their differences for mutual gain – as exemplified by the Iranian President’s visit to Baku in April 2025.
Connectivity and the region’s role in roundabout trade have been key factors behind Russia’s reversal of its long-standing policy of supporting Armenia and leveraging unresolved conflicts for influence. Amid shifting wartime priorities, Moscow reassessed its approach, concluding that alignment with Azerbaijan and Turkey – particularly to secure access to emerging transit corridors – held greater strategic value than continued support for Armenia. In turn, Turkey expanded its influence, formalizing a defence alliance with Azerbaijan and building on existing ties within the Azerbaijan–Georgia–Turkey trilateral framework. The three states conduct annual military exercises and cooperate on major infrastructure projects, including the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline, and the Southern Gas Corridor – a network of pipelines for exporting Azerbaijan gas to Europe.
Iran’s influence in the region is comparatively limited as it lacks significant soft power or a network of proxies. However, it has considerable security interests, chief among them the preservation of its border with Armenia, the containment of irredentism among its Azeri minority, and the management of deepening Azerbaijan–Israel cooperation. Tehran is especially alarmed by the proposed Zangezur Corridor, which would link Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan enclave in Armenia, serving as another lucrative transit route, further boosting Turkey’s influence. The corridor would run along Iran’s border with Armenia, which Tehran fears would diminish Iran’s strategic value in east–west transit and serve as an instrument of containment by Turkey and its allies – referred to by some as ‘NATO’s Turani Corridor.’ Additionally, growing military ties between Azerbaijan and Israel have heightened Tehran’s resolve to preserve strategic access to Nakhichevan and restrain Baku.
Iran has historically benefited from Russian dominance in the South Caucasus, which has limited NATO, Turkish and Israeli influence. Since the Ukraine war, Russia–Iran cooperation has deepened, with military support from Tehran and a new bilateral strategic partnership. Yet Russia offered only muted support for Iran in its conflict with Israel, limiting itself to words of condemnation. Previously, tensions have emerged over the Zangezur Corridor: Russia views it as a chance to reassert influence via border guard deployment, while Iran sees it as a threat to its regional standing. Tehran publicly objected and received Russian assurances that the status quo would be preserved – for now. In recent months, the Trump administration entered the picture by proposing to outsource management of the corridor to a private US company – effectively sidelining both Iran and Russia. Tehran condemned the proposal as part of a broader US strategy to encircle and weaken Iran, not only in the Middle East but also in the South Caucasus.
Regional interlinkages between the South Caucasus and the Middle East
The decline of Russia’s regional hegemony and the spillover of Turkey–Iran–Israel rivalries into the South Caucasus have deepened the region’s interlinkages with the Middle East. The fall of the Assad regime, escalating Iran–Israel tensions, and growing Azerbaijan–Israel military cooperation all carry direct and indirect implications for the Caucasus. As the two regions become increasingly intertwined, Euro-Atlantic influence is waning. Hedging, balancing, and multi-alignment have become the dominant foreign policy strategies – even in Georgia, once the staunchest Western ally.
The potential fallout from direct military confrontations between Iran and Israel further highlights the growing interconnection between the South Caucasus and the Middle East. Armenia fears that Azerbaijan could exploit the regional crisis and Iran’s weakening to seize the Zangezur Corridor, violating Armenian sovereignty. While reliance on Iran has strained Yerevan’s ties with the West, Iran’s decline risks narrowing Armenia’s strategic options and pushing it back towards Russia. In this context, Prime Minister Pashinyan has shown openness to normalizing relations with Turkey, though progress remains contingent on Baku’s consent.
If the war in the Middle East disrupts energy infrastructure, Azerbaijan’s role as a key energy supplier and reliable transit route will become even more critical. However, instability in Iran – particularly in its northern Azerbaijan province – poses spillover risks. The two countries share an 800-kilometre border and a cross-border Azerbaijani minority, raising the possibility of refugee flows into Azerbaijan and of triggering sensitive debates around national and religious identity. The conflict could also impact Baku’s strong ties with Israel, especially if Tel Aviv continues efforts to weaken the Iranian regime by encouraging ethnic and sectarian divisions, potentially fuelling centrifugal pressures in the region.
Multipolar realities and the decline of Western influence
The emerging regional order is shaped by a fluid balance of power between Russia, Turkey and Iran, replacing the previous Russia-dominated framework defined by its rivalry with the West. While Russia’s decline may be temporary, some broader trends are likely to endure. First is the deepening interconnection between the South Caucasus and the Middle East, blurring the line between Russia’s ‘near abroad’ and the broader Global South. Second is the steady erosion of Western normative and geopolitical influence, creating space for rising powers – especially China – to expand their presence. As regional actors adopt multi-alignment and experience democratic backsliding, the appeal of non-Western players continues to grow. In this shifting landscape, transatlantic partners must urgently articulate a coherent regional strategy – clarifying their interests and how to advance them. So far, such a strategy remains absent.
This article is part of a policy series for the ‘Evolving Turkey–Iran relations and implications for regional reordering’ project of the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) network.
The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin is funded by Stiftung Mercator and the Federal Foreign Office. CATS is the curator of the CATS Network, an international network of think-tanks and research institutions working on Turkey.
