Author: Berfin Coşkun, Doctoral researcher, KU Leuven; Non-residential researcher, Kurdish Studies Center
Türkiye’s Kurdish peace process has gone further than any previous attempt to end the country’s over four-decade-long conflict, but it has won public support faster than it has built trust. Launched in October 2024 by Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the process has led the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to dissolve itself and agree to lay down its arms. Yet, a May 2025 Rawest and İstanPol survey found that while 64 per cent of respondents supported the initiative, fewer than 42 per cent expected it to succeed.
The framework law, passed by parliament in August 2026, sets the legal terms of the transition. It covers the conditions for the group’s disarmament and the treatment of former PKK members. However, though legislation may answer an urgent question about what happens to former members, it cannot by itself turn the end of armed struggle into a lasting settlement. That will require tangible legal guarantees, a response to long-standing Kurdish demands and a political system able to work without the conflict as its reference point.
Why now: a process driven by regional security
The roots of this process lie in how Türkiye has long approached the Kurdish question. From the 1980s onwards, the state viewed the issue almost entirely through the lens of the PKK and handled it as a security threat. The 2013–15 peace talks briefly changed that by placing greater emphasis on democratization and Kurdish rights, opening space for discussions on language rights, local democracy and political representation. However, following their collapse in 2015, the Kurdish question was increasingly reframed through national security concerns. Armed conflict escalated, first spreading into urban areas in southeastern Türkiye before increasingly shifting across the borders into northern Iraq and Syria. This period also saw a crackdown on Kurdish political representation, including the imprisonment of elected politicians. While building on earlier attempts to resolve the conflict, the current initiative has been framed primarily around national security and regional stability, with disarmament taking precedence over broader democratic reforms.
This emphasis is largely driven by escalating regional tensions. Since 7 October 2023, Israel’s expanding military operations and the shifting regional balance of power, particularly with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the weakening of Iran, have heightened Ankara’s security concerns. From Türkiye’s perspective, Israel’s increasingly assertive regional strategy threatens to further destabilize its neighbourhood and potentially exploit the unresolved Kurdish question. Against this backdrop, Ankara has sought to address the armed conflict with the PKK as part of a broader effort to strengthen its internal front and reduce its security vulnerabilities.
For the PKK, on the other hand, the post-7 October environment has raised the growing uncertainties facing armed non-state actors in the region. Hezbollah was weakened, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) experienced a reduction in its territorial control before dissolving into the Syrian army. At home, the social constituency of the pro-Kurdish parties has increasingly questioned armed struggle over the past decade, while legal Kurdish politics has grown stronger. For both sides, a conflict that had reached saturation point became more costly to sustain than to end.
Measuring the framework law
Parliament passed the law (No. 7595) on 10 August 2026 by 468 votes to 88, a broad cross-party majority. International guidance on disarmament and reintegration, alongside the experience from other peace processes, highlights the importance of a comprehensive legal framework, clear objectives, defined beneficiaries, proportionate and time-limited measures, effective oversight by independent third parties or parliament, and practical support for former combatants’ social and economic reintegration.
The law meets some of these tests. It defines the offences it covers, the conditions for applying and the application window, and provides for a parliamentary monitoring commission. It also provides for five- and ten-year deferrals of criminal proceedings and the enforcement of prison sentences, depending on the severity of the offence or sentence imposed. These are concrete rules, though they leave applicants facing years of uncertainty.
The gaps are equally consequential. The law centres on criminal procedure and security verification; it does not establish dedicated education, health or employment support for former PKK members. Implementation is coordinated by an executive board led by Vice-President Cevdet Yılmaz, while the parliamentary commission can only monitor and recommend. The commission is expected to be formed in the new legislative session that opened on 1 October 2026, and it will be open to all parties in the parliament. The authorities should publish accessible criteria and regular implementation data, explain how different categories of former members will be treated and provide practical reintegration services. Otherwise, a legal route back may exist on paper without a viable route into society.
What should come next
The law formalized the first stage of the process: ending violence. What follows will depend less on legislation than on political choices. In the medium term, several steps require no new law at all. Selahattin Demirtaş, the former co-chair of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), has been in prison for nearly ten years despite European Court of Human Rights rulings calling for his release. Reinstating the elected mayors replaced by state-appointed trustees, a step Bahçeli himself has endorsed, would restore a basic democratic principle in Kurdish-majority areas. These are political decisions, but in the public eye they would be a clearer sign that the process is working, and the fastest way to build trust in it.
In the longer term, lasting peace will require legal reforms that address the root causes of the conflict. Mother-tongue rights come first: more than 80 per cent of Kurds want Kurdish used in public services, and 71 per cent support bilingual education. Even 42 per cent of Turks do not categorically oppose such rights. The other core demand is tackling discrimination in law and in practice. These reforms will take time, but they need a timetable, not indefinite postponement.
Politics after the PKK
A return to armed struggle could prove strategically costly for the PKK and risk undermining its legitimacy among Kurds, given growing support for disarmament and declining support for armed struggle. Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK’s imprisoned leader, has also repeatedly expressed his commitment to the process. The more important question is how politics in Turkey will work once armed conflict is no longer part of the picture.
For four decades, the PKK has shaped politics on all sides. Governments could defer Kurdish demands in the name of security. The civilian political tradition represented then by HDP and now by the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) was often overshadowed by the armed struggle. In a political environment where the PKK no longer exists, neither the Turkish state nor the DEM Party can rely on familiar habits and narratives. The government will have to make a case for the process to the public on its merits, not as counterterrorism. The DEM Party will have to build and defend a political programme through civilian institutions. And the New Party, now Türkiye’s main opposition party, established by former Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Özgür Özel and his supporters following a court ruling that reinstated the CHP’s previous leadership, will now need to turn its support in principle into concrete proposals.
The process has brought a ceasefire and paved the way for the PKK’s disarmament, marking significant progress towards negative peace: the absence of armed conflict. Yet achieving positive and lasting peace will depend on whether Türkiye’s political actors can move beyond conflict-driven politics and address the remaining disagreements through democratic institutions and processes. This will be the real test of the current initiative.