The mass crossing of young migrants from Morocco into Ceuta in July 2026 serves as a reminder of the need to rethink the European migration model. Many European governments continue to view Morocco and other countries of the Global South as contractors that, under specific arrangements, guard the continent from irregular migration – an approach that takes no account of these countries’ own interests or perspectives. The Ceuta crossing quickly became a subject of mutual accusations among various political factions, evolving from a humanitarian and social event into a more complex matter with geopolitical and security dimensions. Some commentators portrayed it as a Moroccan attempt to pressure Spain over a possible shift in its position on the Western Sahara issue. Spanish officials, including Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, have said there is no evidence that Morocco orchestrated the event, although investigations are still under way to clarify the circumstances of what happened. However, the attempt to identify the perpetrators and speculate about the intentions of those behind the incident (if any) has once again missed the opportunity to address the deep structural crisis that this incident reveals.
The price of a one-sided partnership
A significant contributor to the crisis is Europe’s model of migration management, which traces back to the Tampere European Council in 1999 and extends through the European Neighbourhood Policy and the creation of the European Border agency, Frontex, in 2004. This model has transformed Europe’s relationship with countries on the other side of the border into a conditional and selective one: financial incentives and aid depend on their ability to control their borders and contain migrants within their territories, with little regard for their own development. A model that controls borders ‘by proxy’ and ignores any other developmental dimension quickly collapses at the first real challenge. The events of 2021[1] and 2024[2] show that July’s mass crossing was not unprecedented but part of a recurring pattern, one that was not the result of a security lapse or political calculation, but of a structural flaw in Europe’s solely security-based approach.
Although development is part of Europe’s strategic agenda, the reality reflects a misalignment of priorities when it comes to funding. Of the €234 million allocated to migration support in Morocco under the EU Trust Fund for Africa, 77 per cent went to integrated border management and the fight against smuggling and trafficking, while only 7 per cent went to labour migration, 12 per cent to protecting and stabilizing communities, and 4 per cent to migration governance and voluntary return. Europe cannot rely on Morocco to remain a faithful guardian of its borders, mobilizing all its logistical and material resources to do this, without genuine investment in economic prospects that meet Moroccans’ expectations and address their challenges.
At the same time as it closes its doors to irregular migration, Europe opens parallel channels to attract skilled workers from other countries – at their expense. Reports indicate that approximately 700 doctors – about one-third of Morocco’s medical school graduates – emigrate abroad, predominantly to Europe, each year. Training a single doctor costs Morocco around $100,000, and the Ministry of Health estimates a shortage of approximately 34,000 doctors. This costly brain drain – as exemplified by the situation in the medical field – creates a direct financial and developmental problem. As countries of origin lose talent in vital fields such as medicine and engineering, their capacity for growth and development is weakened, while Europe benefits from a vast pool of human resources that compensates for its own shortages.
Neither additional fortifications nor repeated contingency plans are sufficient to prevent such crises from recurring. The real question that should concern European decision-makers is not how to strengthen Europe’s control over its borders from a purely security-based perspective, but rather how to rethink the framework for managing migration as a genuine partnership – one that takes into account the interests of Morocco and Europe’s other neighbours and also meets their expectations.
The way to move forward
The tools and agreements are already in place, but they lack effectiveness and need to be aligned with what they are intended to achieve.
First, the Morocco–EU talent partnership, which launched in 2023 and had its roadmap approved in 2025, established mechanisms for labour mobility along with training programmes within Morocco. However, the partnership did not take into account the scale or the sectors of the skilled labour Europe attracts annually, and it remained at Europe’s discretion, with Brussels determining its size, sectors and duration. Consequently, a gap has persisted between the need to cover training costs and what Europe actually funds – a gap that can be bridged without any additional agreements in this area.
Second, the EU needs to reconsider how it distributes its funding. Allocating 77 per cent of the budget to border management while only 7 per cent addresses labour migration is not sustainable. Efficiency would require allocating a much larger share of funding to training and programmes that aim to increase young people’s skills and employability, and that target less developed regions with high levels of migration, rather than disbursing it as general national support without consulting the Moroccan authorities and civil society.
Third, negotiations on migration, development and border protection need structural change. These issues should not be addressed through separate tracks as if they were unrelated, since the success of one cannot be guaranteed without the others. Furthermore, the assessment of the success of cooperation cannot be limited to the extent of Morocco’s commitment. There must also be a mechanism to evaluate the effectiveness of European programmes and commitments. This would not only be fair but would also enable the partnership to be refined, improved and strengthened.
These measures would not put Europe in a position that is contrary to its interests. As Ceuta demonstrated, every sudden crisis at the border fuels far-right rhetoric and strengthens exactly the forces the EU is trying to contain.
[1] On 17 and 18 May 2021, approximately 8,000 to 10,000 migrants (including more than 1,500 minors and young people) crossed the body of water separating the Moroccan city of Al-Fnideq from Ceuta.
[2] In September 2024, thousands of young people, mainly from sub-Saharan Africa, gathered in the hills surrounding the city of Al-Fnideq, attempting to breach the border with Europe.