In a Fox News interview on 6 August 2026, US Vice President JD Vance said Iran’s leadership is divided between those favouring negotiations and those ‘crazy radicals’ wanting the war to continue. His description reflects a broader misunderstanding in Washington, which tends to view Iranian decision-making as a simple choice between diplomacy and confrontation. However, the argument in Tehran today is less about whether to negotiate with the US than it is about diplomatic sequencing and pressure: what conditions should precede talks, how much deterrence to establish first, and what costs to bear.
Behind that argument lies a change in posture. Tehran’s approach is shifting from predominantly reactive restraint to calculated strategic unpredictability. Iran now seeks to show that it is willing to impose costs and take risks it previously avoided, while calibrating its actions. It is an approach best described as calibrated offensive deterrence: discouraging attacks by imposing measured yet effective costs, while avoiding uncontrolled escalation.
What the Islamabad talks revealed about Iran’s calculus
The evolution of the debate in Tehran can be traced through the US–Iran Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, signed in June 2026. Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) approved it under military pressure. President Masoud Pezeshkian later said Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had delegated the decision to the council, which ratified it by 12 votes to one, senior military figures among them. A recent Axios account of a US back channel involving the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander Ahmad Vahidi also suggests military backing.
The visit to Tehran in late August by Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir, his meetings with senior security officials, and the positive Iranian assessments of the outcome reinforced that picture: diplomacy itself has not been rejected. This challenges the common Western assumption that Iran’s diplomats favor negotiations while its military opposes them. In the Islamabad case, the disagreement was over timing and the conditions that should precede talks.
The split was visible in senior reactions. Khamenei’s statement following the signing of the Islamabad Memorandum, said the supreme leader’s assessment had differed from that of the SNSC’s, but that he accepted the ratification once the president assured him the agreement would protect Iran’s interests. Two days later, the retired IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei said that he did not oppose negotiations as such, but holding them under a ceasefire, which would give the enemy time to regroup and prepare another attack. His comments may have reflected similar reservations within the leadership.
What changed after the 17-day war
The failure of the Islamabad Memorandum and the resumption of hostilities in July 2026 changed the calculus. After Iran attacked commercial vessels in the Omani section of the Strait of Hormuz, believing Washington had breached the agreement, the US intervened, expanding the confrontation into what Iran later called the 17-day war. Rezaei subsequently said that Iran had continued military operations for two days after US attacks stopped, in order to establish ‘a new level of deterrence’. Iran’s precision attacks, he said, also intensified in the final week, in an effort to increase costs to the other side. His remarks contrast with those of Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, made while the Islamabad Memorandum was still in effect. Araghchi said that reaching the agreement ten days earlier could have saved senior officials like Ali Larijani and prevented the destruction of key economic infrastructure. ‘You cannot gamble with people’s lives,’ he said.
Hence, the July war appeared to strengthen the position of those in Tehran who believed the Islamabad Memorandum alone could not prevent another confrontation. The lesson was that diplomacy without effective – and sometimes offensive – deterrence could leave Iran exposed to renewed attack. This pattern was repeated in early September, when the continued US naval blockade prompted the IRGC to test-fire what Iran described as an anti-ship missile over an American naval vessel. After the firing, Rezaie said on September 6 that the test was intended “to show that we can no longer tolerate the blockade” and to demonstrate that Iran was serious about its threat.
Deterrence before diplomacy
Rezaei’s subsequent appointment as SNSC secretary is therefore significant, given his emphasis on sustained and intensified strikes as the basis for deterrence. Since the July 2026 confrontation, reopening the Strait of Hormuz has increasingly been linked to broader security conditions rather than simply ending the blockade, as was Iran’s position in June. The strait is increasingly being portrayed as effective leverage.
The same logic is reflected in who now explains Iran’s strategy. During the Islamabad negotiations, Araghchi and the parliament speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, were the public faces of diplomacy. Since the war, senior military figures have become more publicly visible, including in foreign media. In a rare interview in August with PBS in Tehran, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, a senior adviser to the IRGC commander, said Iran needed a new level of deterrence ‘so that the enemy never dares to attack us.’
These developments do not mean that Iran has adopted a consolidated military doctrine or that a military government is emerging. The Pezeshkian administration remains central to managing the economy and would play a role in any future negotiations. But for an increasingly influential current within Iran’s leadership, diplomacy is expected to consolidate military deterrence and translate it into political gains, rather than serve as a substitute for building deterrence.
The strategy also has an important domestic dimension. In the same interview in which he argued that Iran had established ‘a new level of deterrence,’ Rezaei warned that Iran’s adversaries would seek to generate internal unrest. In this context, the appointment of Hossein Taeb to lead the Basij, the IRGC’s voluntary paramilitary force, appears significant. Taeb, a veteran IRGC intelligence and security official with extensive experience in managing periods of domestic unrest, has been tasked with strengthening intelligence networks and using new technologies to counter security threats. This is an indication that the leadership expects external pressure and domestic instability to reinforce each other.
The limits of the strategy
Vance’s description of Iran’s leadership captures only part of Tehran’s approach. As long as Washington clings to the outdated view of a fundamental dichotomy within Iran’s political system, it risks misreading the dynamics of decision-making and making further miscalculations—potentially failing to contain a regional fire that could flare up again at any moment. Disagreements within the system undoubtedly exist, but statements by officials at the level of the Supreme National Security Council should be understood as reflecting the position being pursued by the system, rather than dismissed because of opposition from individuals within the establishment or outside commentators. Recent appointments and official rhetoric point to a growing emphasis on calibrated offensive deterrence, while remaining open to negotiations, though it is still too early to call this a new doctrine. But understanding the logic behind this approach does not mean that Iran’s strategy is coherent or sustainable. Tehran may have concluded that diplomacy without effective deterrence leaves Iran vulnerable to another attack. Yet the measures it is taking, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz, could also weaken Iran and gradually narrow its diplomatic options.
The approach does not resolve Iran’s broader strategic weaknesses. Tehran still lacks a clear framework for what it ultimately wants regarding Hormuz, the nuclear issue, relations with Washington, or the regional order. Hormuz is also shifting from an emergency threat to a more sustained source of leverage. While keeping it closed can impose costs on Iran’s rivals and strengthen Tehran’s bargaining position, it also carries serious economic and political costs for Iran. Russia and China are not necessarily comfortable with the current situation either. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said that Moscow opposes imposing transit fees on ships passing through the Strait, although he left the issue open for further discussion. Unconfirmed rumors in Tehran that China has conditioned Ghalibaf’s scheduled visit on reopening the Strait and refraining from shipping fees suggest growing concern over Beijing’s tolerance for the status quo.
Meanwhile, a prolonged crisis could deepen domestic divisions between those seeking a return to diplomacy and those advocating heavier preemptive attacks to break the deadlock. Economic pressure could also fuel protests, which Tehran fears could be exploited or supported from abroad. Past experience shows that economically driven unrest can also create military risks.
Ultimately, Iran’s strategy depends on whether it can impose costs without triggering uncontrolled escalation, withstand economic pressure, contain domestic discontent, and convince Washington that another military campaign would cost more than it could achieve. Tehran must also use Hormuz as leverage without turning it into a trigger for further US attacks or dissatisfaction among Russia and China. So far, however, the evidence points in the opposite direction.