Iraq’s Supreme Sovereign Council for Integrity, Oversight, and Recovery of Public Funds, created and led by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi in May 2026, is yet another example of anti-corruption bodies being introduced in Iraq while the core problem of impunity remains. Since 2003, numerous commissions, audit offices, parliamentary committees, strategies and councils, have been established, yet corruption continues to drain public resources and erode trust in the government.
The new council brings together the heads of key accountability and anti-corruption agencies and aims to make bureaucracy more efficient. The arrest of a deputy oil minister on corruption charges was one of several early moves as part of the new council’s anti-corruption drive. The June 28 dawn raid arrested several senior politicians and MPs accused of corruption. Still, it does not tackle the ongoing issue of political influence over accountability. Critics see a campaign against the previous administration rather than a bold new strategy. If Prime Minister al-Zaidi can show the determination to break party control over the state, Iraq could finally turn a corner in the fight against corruption after two decades of stagnation.
Proliferation without power
Iraq has built a complex anti-corruption framework that includes the Commission of Integrity, the Board of Supreme Audit, and parliamentary committees. Since 2006, every prime minister has added new oversight bodies to those already in place. These bodies have drafted laws and plans, delivered training and launched investigations, but they have not consistently stopped corruption, punished top officials or recovered much stolen money. This pattern has bred scepticism, since Iraq’s real problem is not a lack of institutions, but their weakness, politicization and uneven enforcement.
Prime Minister al-Zaidi is attempting to change things up. He has declared that he will “suffocate corruption” and high-profile arrests of government officials are winning over some of the public. The prime minister insists there are no red lines and no politicians will be immune from anti-corruption measures. Given that al-Zaidi appears to have strong relations with the judiciary and that the judiciary has become crucial to the political system in Iraq, there may be an opportunity to tackle the political power behind corruption.
Systemic kleptocracy and muhasasa
The main obstacle to tackling corruption is muhasasa, the power-sharing system established after 2003. Ministries, top jobs, contracts and state-owned companies are often divided among political parties as rewards, embedding patronage within the state. This turns public resources into tools for funding parties, rewarding loyalists and protecting elite groups.
In this system, elections often determine which parties control ministries that raise revenue, rather than producing a clear separation between government and opposition. As a result, anti-corruption agencies that try to stop these revenue flows end up challenging the very basis of the ruling system, not just individual cases of abuse. This is why oversight bodies are often limited, bypassed or reorganized repeatedly.
Politicized ‘independent’ institutions
Institutions like the Commission of Integrity and the Board of Supreme Audit are officially independent, but their independence is weakened by executive control, political deals and dependence on government funding. When the political groups under investigation also select the leaders of these bodies, the institutions become vulnerable to outside pressure and uneven enforcement.
Former prime minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi’s anti-corruption committee clearly illustrates this problem. It pursued some well-known figures, but it ignored the multi-billion-dollar ‘theft of the century‘ that occurred while it was active. The Federal Supreme Court shut down the committee in 2022 on constitutional grounds, but many questions remain about its work. This reflects a larger problem: Iraq’s anti-corruption efforts are full of overlapping mandates, temporary bodies and actions that can be co-opted in power struggles among elites.
Judiciary and enforcement gaps
Anti-corruption agencies depend on prosecutors, judges, police and ministries, many of which are tied to patronage networks. Even when investigators build strong cases, the process can be slowed, weakened or blocked if the accused has powerful connections. Important investigations often fail because warrants are not executed, documents go missing, judges are reassigned or state institutions fail to cooperate.
The Board of Supreme Audit has strong technical capacity, but audits only matter if their findings lead to real consequences. The Commission of Integrity faces the same problem. Poor follow-up, lack of transparency and political unwillingness in parliament make oversight less effective. As a result, these institutions often produce reports and referrals, but elite behaviour remains unchanged.
Coercion, risk and weak social protection
Investigating major corruption is dangerous. Armed groups linked to political parties and criminal networks often threaten, smear, sue or attack investigators, journalists and whistle-blowers. Even though major scandals like the ‘theft of the century’ have angered the public, top officials are rarely held accountable.
Existing institutions have had some successes, such as recovering stolen funds and convicting lower- and mid-level officials. But the most powerful people – top politicians, ministers, party funders and paramilitary leaders – usually avoid punishment. This makes it seem like anti-corruption efforts only go after weaker figures or rivals, while the main system stays the same.
Real independence is needed for real change
Al-Zaidi’s council may enhance coordination and expedite referrals; however, it faces the same underlying problems as earlier bodies. Placing oversight under the prime minister could centralize power further and lead to the same constitutional issues that undermined past efforts. Without real independence, strong protections and steady enforcement, another council is unlikely to change the main incentives. Politicized oversight bodies, compromised enforcement mechanisms and the coercive influence of party-paramilitary networks persist. Unless Iraq insulates oversight institutions from party influence, strengthens judicial independence, safeguards investigators and journalists, and curtails the use of public office for patronage, al-Zaidi’s council, if it remains active, is likely to represent another symbolic addition to an already saturated anti-corruption landscape.